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INTRODUCTION
Over ten years ago Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act (TVPA).1 This Article is the first comprehensive study that examines

1. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) [hereinafter TVPA]. For a discussion of the TVPA, see
generally Terry Coonan, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act: A Work in Progress, 1
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99 (2006); Angela D. Giampolo, The Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005: The Latest Weapon in the Fight
Against Human Trafficking, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 195 (2006); Sally Terry
Green, Protection for Victims of Child Sex Trafficking in the United States: Forging the
Gap Between U.S. Immigration Laws and Human Trafficking Laws, 12 U.C. DAVIS J.
JUV. L. & POL’Y 309 (2008); Elizabeth Kaigh, Whores and Other Sex Slaves: Why the
Equation of Prostitution with Sex Trafficking in the William Wilberforce
Reauthorization Act of 2008 Promotes Gender Discrimination, 12 SCHOLAR 139
(2009); Rosy Kandathil, Global Sex Trafficking and the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act of 2000: Legislative Responses to the Problem of Modern Slavery, 12 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 87 (2005); Sonia Merzon, Extraterritorial Reach of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 887 (2007).
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the cases decided in accordance with the Act.2 An initial reading of court
decisions suggests a significant expansion of criminal liability and a broad
interpretation of the offenses that were recognized for the first time to
punish those who commit the act of trafficking in persons. After discussing
the categorization of the crime of trafficking in persons as a contemporary
form of slavery that subjects a victim of trafficking to exploitation, the
Article explores how courts define the various elements of the crime of
trafficking in persons, including a commercial sex act of prostitution or
pornography as a purpose of trafficking, the meaning of forced labor or
services as the other purpose of trafficking, serious harm and how it was
recently broadened to include nonphysical types of harm, threats of
deportation as a form of abuse of the legal process, and when threats of
deportation amount to involuntary servitude as well as indebtedness as the
basis for the offense of peonage. Then the Article will refer to several
constitutional challenges that were raised by defendants trying to escape
liability under the TVPA, in particular the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution, the Interstate Commerce Clause, the prohibition against
double jeopardy, and the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The Article will
show that most constitutional claims failed.
However, diplomatic
immunity still serves as a shield from prosecution, and this required a
congressional amendment to the TVPA. The TVPA was also amended to
apply on an extraterritorial basis, thus changing existing presumption
against extraterritoriality. The Article will conclude by addressing how
courts establish the relationship between domestic legislation and
international law, especially the United Nations Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, which the United States ratified.
This Article is divided into six parts. Part I explores the nature of the
crime of trafficking in persons and raises the question whether it should be
categorized as a form of exploitation rather than as a form of slavery. Part
II will examine the definitions of the elements of the crime of trafficking in
persons as interpreted by the courts. Part III covers constitutional
challenges that may threaten the application of the TVPA and related
statutes. Part IV addresses the courts’ conclusion that the TVPA does not
override diplomatic immunity. Part V discusses when the TVPA applies
on an extraterritorial basis and the potential evolution of court decisions
from the traditional principle of territoriality to extraterritoriality as an
international response to an international crime. Finally, Part VI calls upon
2. For articles discussing the various aspects of the TVPA, see generally
Mohamed Mattar, Trafficking in Persons: An Annotated Legal Bibliography
Delineating Five Years of Development, 2005-2009, 2 PROTECTION PROJECT J. HUM.
RTS. & CIV. SOC’Y 153-209 (2009); Mohamed Mattar, Trafficking in Persons: An
Annotated Bibliography, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 669 (2004).
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courts to incorporate international law on trafficking in persons in U.S.
court decisions.
I. THE NATURE OF THE CRIME OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: A FORM OF
SLAVERY OR EXPLOITATION
A. From the Mann Act to the TVPA
The TVPA of 2000 recognized for the first time trafficking in persons as
a specific offense. Forced labor, trafficking with respect to peonage,
slavery, involuntary servitude, forced labor, sex trafficking of children or
by force, fraud, or coercion, unlawful conduct with respect to documents,
and attempting to commit any of these acts were all identified as crimes in
the TVPA of 2000.3 The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2005 (TVPRA 2005)4 identified a separate crime: trafficking in
persons offenses committed by federal contractors outside the United
States.5 Benefitting financially from peonage, slavery, or trafficking in
persons,6 conspiring in an act of trafficking in persons,7 and fraud in
foreign labor contracting8 were criminalized under the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA
2008).
Prior to the passage of the TVPA, cases of transportation of a person for
the purpose of prostitution were decided under the Mann Act,9 which was
3. New sections of chapter 77 of Title 18 of the United States Code created by the
TVPA include: 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor) (2006); id. § 1590 (trafficking with
respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor); id. § 1591 (sex
trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion); id. § 1592 (unlawful conduct
with respect to documents in furtherance of trafficking, peonage, slavery, involuntary
servitude, or forced labor); id. § 1593 (mandatory restitution); id. § 1594 (specifying
that attempting to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591 is
punishable in the same manner as an actual violation).
4. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–
164, § 103(a)(1), 119 Stat. 3558 (2005) [hereinafter TVPRA 2005].
5. See id. § 3271 (creating a new section defining “[t]rafficking in persons
offenses committed by persons employed by or accompanying the federal government
outside the United States”).
6. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 222(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) [hereinafter TVPRA
2008].
7. See id. § 222(c)(2)(B)-(C).
8. See id. § 222(e)(2).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 2424 (2006) (“(a) Transportation With Intent To Engage in
Criminal Sexual Activity— A person who knowingly transports an individual who has
not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any
commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the
individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be
charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less
than 10 years or for life. (b) Travel With Intent To Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct.—
A person who travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a
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passed in 1910. The current version of the Mann Act makes it a felony to
knowingly transport any person in interstate or foreign commerce for
prostitution or any sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a
criminal offense.10 Although the Mann Act11 is sometimes employed to
prosecute cases of trafficking in persons, the two acts are distinguishable.
Unlike the TVPA, the Mann Act does not require proof of force, fraud, or
coercion.12 This lowers the burden of proof on the government for
convicting the accused of trafficking offenses. For instance, in United
States v. Daneman,13 a case decided in 2008, defendants were charged with
United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States
who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual
conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
30 years, or both. (c) Engaging in Illicit Sexual Conduct in Foreign Places.— Any
United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign
commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. (d) Ancillary
Offenses.— Whoever, for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial
gain, arranges, induces, procures, or facilitates the travel of a person knowing that such
a person is traveling in interstate commerce or foreign commerce for the purpose of
engaging in illicit sexual conduct shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than 30 years, or both. (e) Attempt and Conspiracy.— Whoever attempts or conspires
to violate subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) shall be punishable in the same manner as a
completed violation of that subsection.”). For cases decided upon the Mann Act prior
to the passage of the TVPA, see generally Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960);
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955); United States v. Vang, 128 F.3d 1065 (7th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
York, No. 92-3800/3801, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26652 (6th Cir. filed Oct. 8, 1993);
United States v. Scott, No. 92-6435, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20033 (6th Cir. July 26,
1993); United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Riley,
684 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1982); Cleveland v. United States, 146 F.2d 730 (10th Cir.
1945).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1421-24 (2006).
11. For a discussion of the Mann Act, see generally Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery
and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2977 (2006); Ariel R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the
Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756 (2006); Laura Elizabeth Brown, Comment,
Regulating the Marrying Kind: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of
Polygamy Under the Mann Act, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 267 (2008).
12. However, cases in which force was used can be prosecuted under the Mann
Act, as was the case with United States v. Flavors, where the defendant was convicted
of violating the Mann Act’s prohibition on transportation of an individual for
prostitution. United States v. Flavors, 15 F. App’x 491 (9th Cir. 2001). According to
some, this requirement of force, fraud, or coercion to qualify as a “severe form of
trafficking” is a serious flaw of the TVPA. For example, “consider an Iraqi woman
who willingly enters into prostitution to support her family and is subsequently
trafficked into Syria where her pimp insists she work off the cost of the journey and
living expenses before being allowed to return home. The trafficker, having neither
committed a fraud, nor used force or threats of force, and having made forceful
demands that do not rise to the definition of ‘debt bondage’ is not engaged in a severe
form of trafficking in persons.” Margaret Maffai, Comment, Accountability for Private
Military and Security Company Employees that Engage in Sex Trafficking and Related
Abuses While Under Contract with the United States Overseas, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J.
1095, 1119 (2009).
13. No. 06 Cr. 717 (AKH), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42725 (S.D.N.Y. May 30,
2008). For cases decided under the Mann Act, see generally United States v. Hill, 552
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Mann Act violations including conspiracy to transport individuals in
interstate commerce to engage in prostitution14 and conspiracy to induce or
persuade individuals to travel in interstate commerce to engage in
prostitution.15 The government relied on undercover police officers who
stated that they were offered sex in exchange for money by the defendants,
large amounts of sexual paraphernalia, and phone calls with the taxi driver
who provided women to work as prostitutes at various businesses.16
Similarly, in United States v. Pipkins,17 the defendants were charged and
convicted with conspiring to participate in a juvenile prostitution enterprise
affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity,18
enticing juveniles to engage in prostitution,19 using interstate facilities to
carry on prostitution,20 extortion in violation of the Hobbes Act,21
involuntary servitude,22 transfer of false identification documents,23 and
distribution of marijuana and cocaine to minors.24 The defendants were
sentenced to a total of 30 years.
B. Creating a “Climate of Fear” Through Coercive Methods
In United States v. Warren,25 the Eleventh Circuit discussed the “climate
of fear” that coercion may create in cases of trafficking in persons. Though
proof of coercion is an additional burden required under the TVPA, it is
satisfied by a broad range of behavior. The court stated that various forms
F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Osley, 302 F. App’x 896 (11th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Scott, 529 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 2008).
14. Daneman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42725, at *1; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2421
(2006).
15. Daneman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42725, at *2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2422.
16. Daneman, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 42725, at *2 (charging a violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1589-90 although “two of the defendants, Kim and Shim, were also tried on
one count of conspiracy to provide or obtain the labor or services of a person through a
scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause such person to believe that if she did not
perform the labor, she or another person would suffer serious harm or physical
restraint,” they were not convicted of these offenses because there was not sufficient
evidence of the coercive measures charged).
17. United States v. Pipkins (Pipkins II), No. 1:06-CV-2629-JOF, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 81068 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2007).
18. Id. at *1; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
19. Pipkins II, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81068, at *1-2; see also § 2422(b).
20. Pipkins II, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81068, at *2; see also § 1952(a)(3).
21. Pipkins II, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81068, at *2; see also § 1951 (2006).
22. Pipkins II, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81068, at *2; see also § 1584 (2006).
23. Pipkins II, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81068, at *2; see also § 1028 (2006).
24. Pipkins II, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81068, at *2; see also 21 U.S.C. § 859.
25. 772 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1985). For earlier cases in which the court discussed
the climate of fear created by coercion, see generally United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d
1095 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss4/14

6

MATTAR 8/15/2011

10/6/2011 12:56:39 PM

Mattar: Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of the Criminal Statutes of

2011] INTERPRETING THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT

1253

of coercion may constitute a holding in involuntary servitude, and the use,
or threatened use of physical force to create a climate of fear is the most
grotesque example of such coercion. Warren detailed the frightening and
all-too common method by which migrant workers are lured into and kept
in involuntary servitude. Often they are deceived by the promise of short
term work and voluntarily enter the labor camp. Upon arriving, they are
kept for a few days and later informed that they are being charged for
meals and other necessities and that they may not leave until their “debt” is
paid. Threats and acts of violence26 are then used to create a climate of fear
that intimidates the workers and prevents them from leaving the camp.
Even if the worker were to have the opportunity to escape, fear of physical
harm may prevent that worker from attempting to flee.
However, trafficking in persons is not always identified as a crime of
violence. For instance in United States v. Norris,27 the defendants had been
charged and convicted of conspiracy to hold young women to a condition
of peonage, to obtain forced labor and services of young women, and to
traffic young women for commercial sex acts. The Eleventh Circuit
rejected the appeal from the district court’s decision to impose pretrial
detention on the grounds that these are “crimes of violence” as defined
under 18 U.S.C. § 3156.28
C. The Victim of Trafficking as a “Vulnerable Victim”
The standards for proving coercion may be affected by the victim’s
“special vulnerabilities.” As the Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Kozminski,29 a “victim’s age or special vulnerability may be relevant in
determining whether a particular type or a certain degree of physical or
legal coercion is sufficient to hold that person to involuntary servitude.”30
26. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-939 (2000) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2000
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1380, 1392-93 (defining the term “serious harm,” as used in the TVPA,
as including both physical and nonphysical harm, thus making the victims of human
trafficking also victims of a violent crime, whether it be physical or psychological
violence).
27. 188 F. App’x 822 (11th Cir. 2006).
28. Id. at 829-30 (“Whether a person poses danger to the community under 18
U.S.C. § 3142 depends on four factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence . . . ; (2) the weight of the
evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; and (4)
the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be
posed by the person’s release”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(A)-(B) (2006)
(defining “crime[s] of violence” to include “an offense that has an element of the
offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person”).
29. See 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (defining “involuntary servitude” and remanding
conviction of appellee for new trial in light of the clarified definition).
30. See id. at 948 (illustrating that “a child who is told he can go home late at night
in the dark through a strange area may be subject to physical coercion that results in his
staying, although a competent adult plainly would not be. Similarly, it is possible that
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Whether these special vulnerabilities may give rise to the application of
the vulnerable victim enhancement doctrine31 is a matter of debate. The
vulnerable victim enhancement doctrine affirms that crimes committed
against a susceptible victim warrant an enhanced penalty for the offender.
In United States v. Sabhnani,32 the Second Circuit found the defendants
guilty of holding in peonage two Indonesian women they brought to the
country illegally and subjected to forced labor. One of the maids, a 53year-old woman from Indonesia, agreed to come to the United States to
work for the defendant for $200 per month as a domestic servant from
February 2002 through May 2007, even though the visa obtained for her
expired in May 2002.33 The maid was told that her salary was being paid to
her daughter in Indonesia, but in reality, her daughter received only $100
per month and the maid received no money herself.34 She was responsible
for cooking, cleaning, laundry, and other chores in the defendant’s threestory home.35 The maid was required to sleep first on the carpet outside
one of the children’s bedrooms and then on a mat on the floor in the
kitchen.36 She was not given adequate food and was subjected to extreme
physical and psychological abuse while she worked in the defendant’s
home. She was often beaten with household objects such as a broom, a
rolling pin, and an umbrella, and, on at least three occasions, the defendant
punished her by throwing boiling water on her.37 In late 2004 and early
2005, the defendant acquired another domestic servant, also an Indonesian
woman who spoke no English and had received very little education. She
was subjected to similar conditions, including at one point being forced to
threatening an incompetent with institutionalization or an immigrant with deportation
could constitute the threat of legal coercion that includes involuntary servitude, even
though such a threat made to an adult citizen of normal intelligence would be too
implausible to produce involuntary servitude.”).
31. For a discussion of the vulnerable victim enhancement, see generally ThirtyEighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Sentencing Guidelines, 38 GEO. L.J.
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 681 (2009); Jay Dyckman, Note, Brightening the Line:
Properly Identifying a Vulnerable Victim for Purposes of Section 3A1.1 of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1960 (1998); Raegan Joern, Note, Mean
Streets: Violence Against the Homeless and the Makings of a Hate Crime, 6 HASTINGS
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 305 (2009); Andrew Nash, Note, Victims by Definition, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 1419 (2008); Jordan Blair Woods, Comment, Taking the “Hate” Out
of Hate Crimes: Applying Unfair Advantage Theory to Justify the Enhanced
Punishment of Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 489 (2008); Madeline
Yanford, Targeting the Criminally Depraved Mind: The Inherent Meaning of a
“Vulnerable Victim” Under Federal Sentencing Guideline § 3A1.1, 9 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADV. 103 (2004).
32. 599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2010).
33. Id. at 225.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 226.
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stand in one place for ten hours after she was accused of stealing two
pieces of chocolate.38
In applying the vulnerable victim enhancement doctrine, the Second
Circuit recognized that the TVPA included congressional findings that
most victims of trafficking are vulnerable victims: “traffickers often
transport victims from their home communities to unfamiliar destinations,
including foreign countries away from family and friends, religious
institutions, and other sources of protection and support, leaving the
victims defenseless and vulnerable.”39 The victims are often “unfamiliar
with the laws, cultures, and languages of the countries in which they have
been trafficked because they are often subjected to coercion and
intimidation including physical detention and debt bondage”40 and they
hesitate to report the crimes perpetrated against them because they “often
fear retribution and forcible removal to countries in which they will face
retribution or other hardship . . . .”41 However, the court concluded that the
text of the criminal statute of the TVPA does not explicitly incorporate
vulnerability into the definition of the victim, thereby allowing for variable
amounts of victim vulnerability based on the situation.42
The court affirmed the findings of the district court that the victims were
particularly vulnerable and susceptible to the criminal conduct of the
defendant. It stated:
neither one spoke a word of English; had never been in the United States
before; were totally dependent upon the defendants for their basic human
needs of food, clothing and shelter; they never received any direct
payment for services . . . and were therefore unable to support
themselves . . . . They were in a situation where they had to accept these
abusive conditions, of course because they had no alternative.43

Immigration status can also create special vulnerabilities for a victim.
Under the TVPA, benefits are granted to victims of trafficking irrespective
of their immigration status.44 In fact, an inquiry into the victim’s
38. Id. at 227-28.
39. Id. at 253 (quoting TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(b)(5), 114 Stat. 1464

(2000)).
40. Id. at 254 (quoting TVPA § 102(b)(20)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 255.
43. Id.; see also United States v. Sung Bum Chang, 237 F. App’x 985 (5th Cir.
2007) (noting that the illegal status and language deficiencies of the victims allowed
the vulnerable victim enhancement provisions to be applied).
44. See TVPRA 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 107(b)(1)(E), 177 Stat. 2875 (2003).
In addition, a victim of trafficking should not lose such status even if the victim refuses
to continue cooperating with a law enforcement official. See United States v.
Maksimenko (Maksimenko II), No. 05-80187, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45615 (E.D.
Mich. June 25, 2007).
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immigration status may undermine the objectives of the TVPA because
such an inquiry might discourage victims from seeking legal action against
their traffickers as was the rule provided in David v. Signal International,
LLC.45 In this case, 500 Indian men were allegedly trafficked into the
United States to work for a construction company, Signal International, in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, using the H-2B guest-worker
program.46 They were subjected to discrimination, forced labor, threats of
deportation, overcrowded working and living conditions, unpaid wages for
work and overtime, and other forms of abuse and exploitation.47 The
plaintiffs sought a protective order against inquiring into their current
immigration status after the termination of their employment with the
defendant. The court concluded that “[e]ven if current immigration status
were relevant to plaintiffs’ race/national origin discrimination, contract and
tort claims, discovery of such information would have an intimidating
effect on an employee’s willingness to assert his workplace rights.”48 The
court explained:
This is also an action for unpaid wages and overtime for work actually
performed for Signal. Courts have recognized the in terrorem effect of
inquiring into a party’s immigration status and authorization to work in
this country when irrelevant to any material claim because it presents a
‘danger of intimidation [that] would inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their
rights.’ Here, plaintiffs’ current immigration status is a collateral issue.
The protective order becomes necessary as ‘it is entirely likely that any
undocumented [litigant] forced to produce documents related to his or
her immigration status will withdraw from the suit rather than produce
such document and face . . . potential deportation.’49

In addition to enhancing the penalty in cases of trafficking where the
trafficked person is a vulnerable victim and therefore susceptible to

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

257 F.R.D. 114 (E.D. La. 2009).
Id. at 117.
Id. at 117-19.
Id. at 122.
Id. (quoting Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) and Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)) (holding that FLSA
covers all workers whether undocumented or not and that “such a position not only
benefits the individual workers, but advances the goals of the FLSA” because allowing
an employer to circumvent the labor laws as to undocumented aliens “permits abusive
exploitation of workers, and creates an unacceptable economic incentive to hire
undocumented workers by permitting employers to underpay them. To allow the
immigration status of a class representative to be investigated - indeed to require a
representative to enjoy legal immigration status - would seriously undermine the
effectiveness of the FLSA”); see also EEOC v. First Wireless Grp., Inc., 225 F.R.D.
404 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (ruling that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in
determining there was good cause to issue a protective order where disclosure of
immigration status could cause embarrassment, potential criminal charges, or
deportation).
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trafficking, the courts provide the victim with a mandatory restitution to
compensate the victim “to the full amount of the victim’s losses.”50
D. Shifting the Focus from Slavery to Exploitation: Defining the Essence of
Trafficking in Persons
In these and other cases, trafficking in persons is commonly analyzed as
a form of slavery51 and the broadening definition of slavery in American
jurisprudence, especially under the TVPA,52 may support the conclusion
50. See United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2010) (defining victim’s
losses as “the value of the victim’s labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and
overtime guarantees of the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . ,” overturning the lower court
ruling which “consulted the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) minimum wage and
overtime provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207, and determined minimum wage rates
for the period of Samirah’s and Enung’s labor, which it multiplied by a statutorily
determined factor to calculate overtime pay. The court performed its calculations on
the basis that the maids worked 24 hours per day when the Sabhnanis were at home,
and eight hours per day when the Sabhnanis left the country during the summer
months. The court subtracted the money that had actually been paid to the victims’
families in Indonesia. Finally, it doubled the total award pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216,
which allows for double damages for employers who violate the FLSA’s minimum
wage and overtime provisions. Based on these calculations, the district court awarded
$620,743.82 to Samirah and $315,802.40 to Enung . . . . We agree that the district
court erred in awarding overtime pay, and thus we vacate the restitution award and
remand for recalculation. We conclude, however, that the district court was within its
discretion not to hold an evidentiary hearing and that it did not err in awarding
liquidated damages.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1593(b)(3) (2006); United States v. Fu
Sheng Kuo 588 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2009).
51. See Susan Tiefenbrun, Copyright Infringement, Sex Trafficking, and
Defamation in the Fictional Life of a Geisha, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 327, 365 (2004)
(“Since U.S. law and international law both establish that sex trafficking is a form of
slavery, consent should not be a probative issue in the requisite proof of sex trafficking
because one cannot legally consent to slavery.”); Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Sex Slavery in
the United States and the Law Enacted to Stop It Here and Abroad, 11 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 317, 318 (2005) [hereinafter Tiefenbrun, Sex Slavery] (arguing that sex
trafficking is a modern form of slavery and violates numerous fundamental human
rights). See generally Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the
Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008); Kathleen A. McKee, Modern-Day Slavery: Framing
Effective Solutions for an Age-Old Problem, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 141 (2005); Valerie
Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing
International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605 (2004) (providing a link between
trafficking and slavery under the Rome statute); Note, Remedying the Injustices of
Human Trafficking Through Tort Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2574 (2006) (discussing
restitution through criminal prosecution and readiness through civil suits under the
TVPRA 2003 and specific tort claims). But see Jacqueline Bermen, The Left, the
Right, and the Prostitute: The Making of U.S. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Policy, 14
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 269 (2006) (arguing that equating human trafficking and
sexual slavery is a damaging over-simplification); Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the
Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade,
25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 207 (2007); Ryszard Piotrowicz, The Legal Nature of Trafficking in
Human Beings, 4 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 175 (2009).
52. See Kyle Cutts, Note, A Modicum of Recovery: How Child Sex Tourism
Constitutes Slavery Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 58 CASE W. RES. L.R. 277, 304
(2007) (“This modern understanding of slavery which the U.S. government appears
willing to accept, applies equally to the problem of child sex tourism as it does to sex
trafficking, an act which often involves children . . . . [T]he purveyors of children for
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that human trafficking constitutes slavery. According to this view, “[t]he
terms ‘human trafficking’ and ‘slavery’ are interchangeable.”53 However,
one may argue that trafficking in persons does not always constitute a form
of slavery and that the definition under international law is now shifting the
focus from slavery to exploitation. One must admit that the distinction
between slavery and trafficking is not always clear. The general consensus
is that there are instances of trafficking in which the victim is treated as
property. While this may be true, slavery under international law requires
“the exercise of any or all the powers attached to the right of ownership”54
in accordance with the 1926 Convention on Slavery.55 Equally, practices
similar to slavery, namely under article one of the 1956 Supplementary
Convention,56 such as debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage, and sale of
children are to be considered slavery-like conditions only if they involve
“the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers
attaching the right of ownership are exercised.”57
Though this narrow definition of slavery finds some support in American
jurisprudence,58 the requirement that trafficking must amount to slavery is
sex tourists tend to coerce the children through psychological, as opposed to physical,
force - despite some exceptions. Under this modern approach to slavery adopted by
congress, child victims are clearly kept in states of slavery by both their proprietors and
their customers. These children may therefore be considered slaves under U.S. law.”);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States.”).
53. See generally Kelly E. Hyland, The Impact of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 8 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 30 (2001) (“The modern concept of trafficking is a combination of traditional
trafficking and slavery definitions. As such, trafficking involves both the enticement
and deception elements from traditional trafficking, and the exploitation and slaverylike practices from traditional slavery and forced labor.”); George S. Yaconbian,
Heather J. Clawson, & Nicole Dutch, An Examination of Law Enforcement Responses
to Human Trafficking in the United States: A Compliance Assessment of U.S.
Obligations under Customary and Conventional International Law, 15 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 157 (2008) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
REPORT (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82902.pdf).
54. See Slavery Convention art. 1(1), Sep. 4, 1926, 46 Stt. 2184, L.N.T.S. 253
(providing a definition of slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any
or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised”); Anne T.
Gallagher, Human Rights and Human Trafficking: Quagmire or Firm Ground? A
Response to James Hathaway, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 789, 810 (2009) (discussing the
definition of slavery in the context of international law).
55. Slavery Convention, supra note 54, at art. 1(1).
56. Supplemental Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institution and Practices Similar to Slavery, § 1, Apr. 30, 1957, 266 U.N.T.S. 3
(prohibiting slavery and the slave trade in all forms).
57. Slavery Convention, supra note 54, at art. 1(1).
58. James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking,” 49
VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 5-6 (2009) (“In short, the decision to take action against ‘human
trafficking,’ rather than against slavery in all of its contemporary forms, has given
comfort to those who prefer not to tackle the claims of the majority of enslaved persons
. . . . The anti-trafficking campaign privileges a small subset of persons subject to
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not followed by American courts. In Doe v. Reddy,59 a U.S. district court
in California noted that “[m]any cases and international instruments make
clear . . . that modern forms of slavery violate jus cogens norms of
international law, no less than historical chattel slavery.”60 Thus, the court
rejected the defendant’s claim that forced labor must amount to “actual
slavery.”61 In this case, eleven workers were recruited by the Reddy family
to work in the real estate business. Once they arrived, they were allegedly
forced to work long hours under difficult working conditions and they were
sexually and physically abused by the defendant.62
Trafficking in persons is commonly interpreted as a form of slavery that
is prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment,63 which was intended to
apply to all cases of slavery.64 In United States v. Nelson,65 the Second
Circuit ruled that:
[T]he Thirteenth Amendment is the denunciation of a condition, and not
a declaration in favor of a particular people. It reaches every race and
every individual, and if in any respect it commits one race to the nation,
it commits every race and every individual thereof. Slavery or
involuntary servitude of the Chinese, of the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon,
are as much within its compass as slavery or involuntary servitude of the
African.66
contemporary forms of slavery, with consequent marginalization of the majority of the
world’s slaves . . . . To the extent that the fight against trafficking has wither drained
limited nongovernmental and international aging resources away from a more holistic
attack on slavery, and to the extent that governments believe that they can (and perhaps
should) attack slavery via the anti-trafficking initiative rather in a more comprehensive
fashion, there is a real loss to the effort to eradicate the predominant forms of
slavery . . . .”).
59. Doe I v. Reddy, No. C 02-05570 WHA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26120 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 4, 2003).
60. Id. at *33.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *36; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery not involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for a crime where of the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.”).
64. But see United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (quoting Butler
v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)) (determining that “the phrase ‘involuntary
servitude’ was intended to extend ‘to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to
African slavery which, in practical operation, would tend to produce like undesirable
results’”).
65. 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002).
66. Id. at 176 (discussing how the Thirteenth Amendment does not specifically
single out the group that it was enacted to protect); see also Buchanan v. City of
Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1358 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment,
plaintiff’s son had a clearly established right to be free from involuntary servitude;
however, a reasonable public official would not be aware that instructing a minor in the
custody of a juvenile officer to wash police vehicles would constitute involuntary
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Similarly, in United States v. Mussry,67 the Ninth Circuit emphasized
that “the 13th Amendment and its enforcing statutes are designed to apply
to a variety of circumstances and conditions . . . [and] to contemporary as
well as to historic forms of involuntary servitude.”68
It is to be noted that the TVPA was passed as a part of the Violence
against Women Act. In distinguishing between the two acts the Ninth
Circuit stated, in United States v. Todd,69 “[t]he TVPA is unlike the
Violence Against Women Act . . . which sought to protect women by
making gender-motivated crimes of violence actionable and was found to
be beyond the power of Congress because its subject matter was not
commerce . . . .”70 However, the TVPA does not emphasize trafficking as a
form of violence against women.71 Similarly, courts rarely utilize the
doctrine of violence against women when discussing cases of trafficking in
persons. However, a few courts have recognized the connection between
violence in intimate relationships and human trafficking. In United States
v. Marcus,72 a New York federal district court rejected the defendant’s
argument that:
The existence of a prior consensual relationship between the defendant
and [the victim] in which the infliction of punishment and pain was part
of their mutual sexual gratification makes it impossible to determine
whether the defendant abused [the victim] to compel the performance of
a commercial sex act . . . [and] the violence inflicted could also have
been for purely sexual pleasure or as a means to reinforce their

servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.”); United States v. King, 840 F.2d
1276, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that parental consent to child slavery is void under
the Thirteenth Amendment and for numerous public policy reasons); United States v.
Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 564 (4th Cir. 1981) (determining that “[t]he amendment and the
legislation were intended to eradicate not merely the formal system of slavery that
existed in the southern states prior to the Civil War, but all forms of compulsory,
involuntary service”); United States v. Lewis, 644 F. Supp. 1391, 1400 (W.D. Mich.
1986) (“The contours of slavery have shifted since the enactment of the Thirteenth
Amendment. No longer is the slave always black and the master white. And, while
subtler forms of coercion have replaced the blatant methods of subjugation practiced in
the ante-bellum south, these new practices are no less effective than their older
counterparts.”).
67. 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 1451.
69. 627 F.3d. 329 (9th Cir. 2010).
70. Id. at 333.
71. See TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(b)(23), 114 Stat. 1464 (2000)
(declaring that “[t]he international community has repeatedly condemned slavery and
involuntary servitude, violence against women, and other elements of trafficking”).
For a discussion of the international responses to violence against women, see
generally Gallagher, supra note 54, at 810; Mohamed Y. Mattar, Access to
International Criminal Justice for Victims of Violence Against Women Under
International Family Law, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 141 (2009).
72. 487 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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previously agreed upon roles in the relationship.73

The court found the evidence—particularly the victim’s statements of
beating and forced sex after she stated that she wanted to leave, which were
photographed for the website—sufficient to show a nexus between the
defendant’s coercion and the labor element of the § 1591 conviction and
the commercial sex act element of the § 1589 conviction. A prior or
current intimate relationship with the victim does not release the trafficker
from liability.74
While prohibition of slavery constitutes the basis for outlawing
trafficking in persons in the TVPA, and the Act makes multiple references
to the concept of slavery,75 it seems that the prohibition of exploitation is a
more appropriate and comprehensive term to explain cases of trafficking in
persons. The essence of exploitation is taking advantage of a vulnerable
victim and subjecting that victim to abuse, undue influence, and control.
Exploitation is defined narrowly by some legal systems as cases in which
a person fears for his or her personal security, and more specifically as any
situation where a person exploits another:
[I]f they cause them to provide or offer to provide labor or service by
engaging in conduct that in all other circumstances could reasonably be
expected to cause the other person to believe that their safety or the
safety of a person known to them would be threatened if they fail to
provide or offer to provide the labor or service.76

This conceptualization of trafficking as a threat to personal security is
based on traditional international legal standards.77 But trafficking may be
more appropriately defined as a threat to human security, a much broader
73. Id. at 309.
74. See id. at 299.
75. See TVPA § 102(a) (“A contemporary manifestation of slavery”); § 102(b)(1)

(“Trafficking in persons is a modern form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation
of slavery today.”); § 102(b)(6) (“Victims are often forced through physical violence to
engage in sex acts or perform slavery-like labor”); § 102(b)(10) (“Within the context of
slavery . . . victims are subjected to a range of violations.”); § 102(b)(12) (“Trafficking
also involves violations of other laws, including . . . laws against . . . slavery.”); §
102(b)(22) (“The U.S. outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865.”); id.
(“Current practices of sexual slavery and trafficking of women and children . . . .”); id.
(“The right to be free from slavery . . . .”); § 102(b)(23) (“International community has
repeatedly condemned slavery.”); § 103(8)(B) (“For the purpose of subjection to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery”.); § 112(a)(2) (“Trafficking
with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor.”); § 112(a)(2)
(“Unlawful conduct with respect to documents in furtherance of trafficking, peonage,
slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor.”).
76. Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, C-46, 279.04 (Can.).
77. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A (Art. III) at 71,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (stating that
“everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (also stating that
“everyone has the right to liberty and security of person”).
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concept.78 This second approach is consistent with the United Nations
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially
Women and Children (U.N. Protocol),79 which defines trafficking in terms
of exploitation and recognizes slavery and practices similar to slavery as
only two of many forms of trafficking.80 Consequently a broader definition
of trafficking as a form of exploitation would be comprehensive enough to
include situations in which a person is subject to control or undue influence
although such person is not enslaved by another.81 As one court explained,
“the essence of a holding to the involuntary servitude is an exercise of
control by one person over another so that the latter is coerced into laboring
for the former.”82
II. DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
A. Defining a Commercial Sex Act as Prostitution and Pornography
Section 103 of the TVPA defines sex trafficking as “the recruitment,
78. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 23 (1994)
(proposing that a definition of human security contain two components: “freedom from
fear and freedom from want”; this definition means “first, safety from such chronic
threats as hunger, disease and repression . . . and second, it means protection from
sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or
in communities”); see also Mohamed Y. Mattar, Human Security or State Security?
The Overriding Threat in Trafficking in Persons, 1 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV.
249 (2006).
79. United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in
Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing, United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/55/25, Annex II (Dec. 25, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Protocol].
80. See id. at art. (3)(a) (“‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”).
81. Consequently, it is not enough to inquire into how a legal system responds to
slavery. All instances of exploitation that may lead to trafficking should be fully
addressed. For the application of this principle in Islamic law, see generally Mohamed
Y. Mattar, COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ISLAMIC LAW
(2009), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/combating-tipin-accordance-with-the-principles-of-islamic-law.html.
82. Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 154 F. Supp. 2d 290, 305 (D. Conn. 2001) (quoting
United States v. Lewis, 644 F. Supp. 1391, 1401 (W.D. Mich. 1986)) (discussing how
the Thirteenth Amendment is inapplicable to a case where minor children were forced
to witness a murder). But see United States v. Mussry, 726 F. 2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.
1984) (defining involuntary servitude as including instances “when an individual
coerces another into his service by improper or wrongful conduct that is intended to
cause, and does cause, the other person to believe that he or she has no alternative but
to perform the labor”).
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harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the
purpose of a commercial sex act,”83 and the Act defines a commercial sex
act as “any sex act on account of which anything of value is given to or
received by any person.”84 A commercial sex act typically means an act of
prostitution.85 It must be noted, however, that the text of the TVPA uses
the term “prostitution” sparingly.86 Furthermore, the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (TVPRA 2003) provided that “[n]o
funds made available to carry out this division . . . may be used to promote,
support, or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution.”87 The
83. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 103(9), 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
84. Id. § 103(3).
85. See generally Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, What Is Choice? Examining Sex

Trafficking Legislation Through the Lenses of Rape Law and Prostitution, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 54 (2008); Edi C. M. Kinney, Appropriations for the Abolitionists:
Undermining Effects of the U.S. Mandatory Anti-Prostitution Pledge in the Fight
Against Human Trafficking and HIV/AIDS, 21 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 158
(2006); Valerie S. Payne, On the Road to Victory in America’s War on Human
Trafficking: Landmarks, Landmines, and the Need for Centralized Strategy, 21 REGENT
U. L. REV. 435 (2008-2009); Henry J. Shea & Pamela J. Abbate, Human Trafficking:
Global and National Responses to the Cries for Freedom, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1
(2008).
86. The TVPA references prostitution in only four places. See TPVA § 102(b)(2)
(“Many of these persons are trafficked into the international sex trade, often by force,
fraud, or coercion. The sex industry has rapidly expanded over the past several decades.
It involves sexual exploitation of persons, predominantly women and girls, involving
activities related to prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, and other commercial
sexual services. The low status of women in many parts of the world has contributed to
a burgeoning of the trafficking industry.”); id. § 102(b)(4) (“Traffickers also buy
children from poor families and sell them into prostitution or into various types of
forced or bonded labor.”); id. § 1513(a)(1)(A) (“Immigrant women and children are
often targeted to be victims of crimes committed against them in the United States,
including rape, torture, kidnapping, trafficking, incest, domestic violence, sexual
assault, female genital mutilation, forced prostitution, involuntary servitude, being held
hostage or being criminally restrained.”); id. § 1513(b)(3)(iii) (“[T]he criminal activity
referred to in this clause is that involving one or more of the following or any similar
activity in violation of Federal, State, or local criminal law: rape; torture; trafficking;
incest; domestic violence; sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual
exploitation; female genital mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involuntary
servitude; slave trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false
imprisonment; blackmail; extortion; manslaughter; murder; felonious assault; witness
tampering; obstruction of justice; perjury; or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to
commit any of the above mentioned crimes.”).
87. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108193, § 7(7), 177 Stat. 2875, 2885-86 (codified as amended at 22 USC § 7110(9)
(2006)) [hereinafter TVPRA 2003].
In American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts v. Sebelius, the plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) for violating the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution when
allowing the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops to impose religious
restrictions on taxpayer funded services for victims of human trafficking, incorporating
language in its subcontractor agreements prohibiting NGOs from using TVPA funds
for “referral for abortion services or contraceptive materials.” 697 F. Supp. 2d 200,
202 (D. Mass. 2010). The Court held that “it cannot be disputed that the TVPA does
not directly mandate HHS to spend taxpayer money in violation of the Establishment
Clause [and] does not order HHS to include religious organizations among the service
providers . . . nor does it specify the exact nature of the social services that are
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TVPRA 2005 addressed a commercial sex act independently from
trafficking in persons for the first time, but it did not change the fact that
prostitution is still exclusively a state crime.88 TVPRA 2005 imposed an
obligation on the federal government to enhance states’ capacities to raise
awareness of the dangers of prostitution and states’ abilities to prosecute
those who commit such an act explicitly. The Act provides that “the
Attorney General may make grants to States and local law enforcement
agencies to establish, develop, expand, or strengthen programs—(B) to
investigate and prosecute persons who engage in the purchase of
commercial sex acts” and “(C) to educate persons charged with, or
convicted of, purchasing or attempting to purchase commercial sex acts.”89
In United States v. Marcus (Marcus I),90 the issue in question was
whether a commercial sex act includes pornography.91 In Marcus I, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York defined a
“commercial sex act” under the TVPA to include both pornography and
prostitution. The court said:
The statutory language provides no basis for limiting the sex acts at issue
to those in which payment was made for the acts themselves; rather, the
use of the phrase ‘on account of which’ suggests that there merely needs
to be a casual relationship between the sex act and an exchange of an
item of value. If Congress has intended to limit the commercial sex acts
reached by the statute to prostitution it could have easily drafted the
statute accordingly.92

Therefore, the term “commercial sex act” defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1591
applies broadly to both photographs of sex acts and the sex acts
themselves.93 The court further observed that:
provided.” Id. at 205.
88. TVPRA 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–164, § 204, 119 Stat. 3558 (2005) (lacking any
provision covering prostitution and giving a definition of related offenses that
specifically leaves the term out).
89. Id. § 204(a)(1)(B)-(C). It must also be noted that prostitution is not considered
a form of labor under the TVPA and the Act distinguishes between sex trafficking and
labor trafficking, unlike other legal systems which define labor trafficking to include a
commercial sex act. The Canadian law on trafficking covers both labor trafficking and
sex trafficking under the single umbrella of exploitation. Canadian Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, C-46, 279.04 (Can.).
90. 487 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
91. Id. at 306 (rejecting the defendant’s claim that a depiction (pornography) was
not a “commercial sex act” within the meaning of the 18 U.S.C. § 1591).
92. Id.
93. See id. (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the meaning of the term
“commercial sex act” is ambiguous, and stating that “while a commercial sex act is
quite broadly defined in the statute, the requirement that it be a product of force, fraud
or coercion precludes the potential broad sweep about which the defendant expresses
concern.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (2006) (providing that, under given
circumstances, it is a crime to cause a person to be engaged in a commercial sex act).
Defendant argued that the TVPA should not apply to “intimate, domestic relationships”
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[T]he government was required to prove three elements beyond a
reasonable doubt in order for the jury to find the defendant guilty of sex
trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591, the government had to prove
that: (1) the defendant engaged in a prohibited trafficking activity; (2)
the defendant’s trafficking activity affects interstate commerce, and (3)
the defendant knowingly used force, fraud or coercion to cause the
trafficking of individual to engage in a commercial sex act.94

Force, fraud and coercion are not separate elements of the offense of sex
trafficking. As another lower federal court stated in United States v.
Paris,95 “force, fraud, and coercion are alternate means to accomplish a
single element.”96 In Marcus I, the court went on to say that, when proving
the offense of sex trafficking, it is not required to show that obtaining a
commercial sex act was the “dominant purpose” of the defendant’s use of
coercion or threats.97 Similarly, existence of a prior consensual relationship
between the defendant and the victim is not determinative in favor of the
defendant.98 Moreover, engaging in a sex act is not an element required for
the establishment of the crime of sex trafficking. For example, in Iowa v.
Russell,99 the applicable state statute required only that a person
“participat[ed] in a venture to recruit, harbor, transport, supply provisions,
or obtain a person for [the purpose of] commercial sexual activity.”100 The
jury was instructed that “commercial sexual activity” is defined as “any sex
act on behalf of which anything of value is given, promised to, or received
and that TVPA was “intended to respond to the ‘problem of international slave
trafficking’ which is ‘a far cry from acts of violence and abuse that take place in the
context of an intimate personal relationship.’” Marcus I, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 299. The
defendant was found guilty of sex trafficking under § 1591 and forced labor. Id.; see
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1589 (2006).
94. Marcus I, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
95. Cr. No. 03:06-cr-64 (CFD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78418 (D. Conn. Oct. 23,
2007).
96. Id. at *36; see also United States v. Powell, No. 04-CR-885, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 288858, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2006) (holding that counts were not
duplicative because “fraud, force, or coercion” were means of accomplishing sex
trafficking, not distinct elements).
97. See Marcus I, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (rejecting the defendant’s claim that a
conviction requires the jury to find that the “dominant purpose” of the force or coercion
was to obtain the commercial sex act or labor or services and concluding there is
nothing in the statute itself or the legislative history that suggests that “the reach of the
statutes should be limited in this manner”).
98. See id. at 309 (finding that the victim’s prior consensual sexual relationship
with the defendant did not preclude a finding of guilt because other circumstances
could be considered).
99. No. 9-906/08-2034, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 145 (Iowa Ct. App. filed Mar. 10,
2010).
100. Id. at *6 (ruling that the defendant erred by concentrating on only one portion
of the relevant definition and holding that “neither the statute nor the instruction
requires proof of sex acts by the recruited persons”); see also IOWA CODE § 710A.1
(2009).
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by any person and includes, but is not limited to, prostitution and
performance in strip clubs.”101 Thus performance in strip clubs is defined
as commercial sexual activity, but stripping is not classified as a sex act.102
A commercial sex act can be further distinguished from a noncommercial sex act by the effect marriage has on the possibility of criminal
action. Prosecution under the IMBRA would be possible in cases of mail
order brides or marriage by catalogue if the defendant exploited the
victim.103 In addition, under the TVPRA 2008 it is possible to prosecute
international marriage brokers for profiting from sex trafficking.104 If a
marriage broker assists a client in bringing a woman to the United States
and is aware that the client’s purpose is to force or coerce the woman to
engage in prostitution, then the broker can be prosecuted for sex
trafficking.105 But if the broker’s client intends to use the woman as his
personal prostitute, then the arrangement no longer falls under the
definition of commercial sex according to the TVPA, whose definition of
commercial sex focuses on a particular “sex act, on account of which
anything of value is given to or received by any person.”106
101. Russell, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 145, at *6-7.
102. In United States v. Pendleton, the defendant, a U.S. citizen, was arrested for an

offense of having sexual contact with a minor, convicted, and incarcerated in Germany.
No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10026 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2009). He was then
tried in the U.S. for traveling in foreign countries to engage in illicit sexual conduct
violating the PROTECT Act. Id. See generally PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21,
117 Stat. 650 (2003). The court noted that “[s]ection 2423(c) is structured to address
both commercial sex offenses and non-commercial sex offenses.” Pendleton, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10026; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3) (2006) (defining the term
“commercial sexual act” as “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is
given to or received by any person”). Commercial sex offenses are criminalized under
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), (f)(2). Non-commercial sex offenses are criminalized under 18
U.S.C. § 2423(c), (f)(1).
103. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1625, 1653 (2007) (discussing the origins of IMBRA and the problems it is meant
to rectify, including the mistreatment and murder of mail-order brides); Erin K.
Pleasant, The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act: Protecting Foreign
Women or Punishing American Men, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 311, 311 (2007) (outlining
the requirements set by the IMBRA, including extensive disclosure requirements on the
part of the potential groom); Roxanne Sims, A Comparison of Laws in the Philippines,
the U.S.A, Taiwan, and Belarus to Regulate the Mail-Order Bride Industry, 42 AKRON
L. REV. 607, 614-25 (2009) (comparing IMBRA to the laws of other countries).
104. See TVPRA 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 222, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008)
(“Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from
participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or
services by any of the means described in subsection (a), knowing or in reckless regard
of the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or
services by any such means, shall be punished [by] imprisonment.”).
105. Suzanne H. Jackson, Marriages of Convenience: International Marriage
Brokers, “Mail-Order Brides,” and Domestic Servitude, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 895, 907
(2007).
106. Id. Also, the requirement of force, fraud, or coercion is problematic. The
“TVPA requires non-consent: the trafficked person must have been ‘induced by force,
fraud, or coercion.’” Kirsten M. Lindee, Love, Honor, or Control: Domestic Violence,
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B. Adopting the Ordinary Meaning of Forced Labor or Services
According to the TVPA, forced labor is defined as:
Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a
person— (1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against,
that person or another person; (2) by means of any scheme, plan, or
pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not
perform such labor or services, that person or another person would
suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (3) by means of the abuse or
threatened abuse of law or the legal process.107

In Marcus I, the defendant argued that the phrase “labor or services” in
the forced labor statute108 should be narrowly construed to “prevent a wide
range of everyday conduct from falling within the reach of the statute”109
and “to exclude household chores performed as part of an intimate living
arrangement.”110 According to this argument, the phrase “labor or
services” “could mean only those forms of work for which a person would
ordinarily be compensated.”111 The defendant also argued that the
legislative history of the TVPA shows that the statute “was only meant to
proscribe conduct that compels the victim to provide labor services ‘for a
business purpose.’”112 The court disagreed, stating that:
Trafficking, and the Question of How to Regulate the Mail-Order Bride Industry, 16
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 563 (2007). According to the INS report to Congress,
“[t]his attention to mail-order marriages reflects growing concern regarding the global
recruitment and transportation of women in a variety of exploitative ways. The
information on trafficking suggests that mail-order brides may become victims of
international trafficking in women and girls . . . . While not all mail-order brides would
be considered trafficked, public policy is shifting to reflect the need to protect people
from the exploitation and violence that results from all forms of trafficking.” U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., INTERNATIONAL MATCHMAKING
ORGANIZATIONS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (1999). It is possible that IMBs may be
classified as facilitators of trafficking, and also that the IMB industry may be sex
traffickers per se. No cases of mail order brides have yet been prosecuted under the
TVPA, however, the issue was raised in European Connections & Tours, Inc. v.
Gonzales. 480 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
107. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, § 112(a)(2), 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2006).
109. United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
110. Id.
111. See id. (making a lenity argument and urging the court to narrowly construe
the phrase “labor or services”).
112. Id. at 301. The court, however, found “no justification for this contention.
While the legislative history of the TVPA undoubtedly focuses primarily on the need to
combat international sex trafficking, the Congressional purpose and findings of the
TVPA make clear the intended broad scope of the legislation. The stated purpose of
the TVPA is ‘to combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery
whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.’” Id. The court went on to say
“[w]hile the court observes that Congress did not expressly indicate its desire to
regulate labor or services performed within the household, the legislative history
provides no cause to believe that Congress intended that type of labor to be excluded
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The ordinary meaning of the term ‘labor’ is an ‘expenditure of physical
or mental effort especially when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory.’
The term ‘services’ is defined as ‘useful labor that does not produce a
tangible commodity.’ These definitions yield scant support for the
defendant’s contention that the usual presence of compensation for the
labor of services at issue should be a requirement for conviction under
the forced labor statute.113

The meaning of forced labor or services was again the issue in United
States v. Kaufman.114 In that case the defendants maintained a home and a
farm for the chronically mentally ill and asked the severely mentally ill
residents to work nude and perform sexually explicitly acts while appearing
on video tapes. The government charged the defendants with violating §
1589 and other statutes.115 The defendants argued that the trial court erred
in failing to limit the definitions of labor and services to “work in an
economic sense.”116 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting that the
legislature created § 1589 as part of the TVPA to expand Kozminski’s
limited definition of coercion under § 1584.117 The court concluded that
“[t]here is no indication that Congress sought to limit the scope of ‘labor or
services’ in the manner suggested by the Kaufmans.”118 The court
continued:
In our view, if an antebellum slave was relieved of the responsibility for
harvesting cotton, brought into his master’s house, directed to disrobe
and then engage in the various acts performed by the Kaufman House
residents on the videotapes (e.g., masturbation and genital shaving), his
or her condition could still be fairly described as one of involuntary
servitude and forced labor.119

from the legislation’s reach . . . . Moreover, while the legislative history does not
address situations where traffickers have intimate relationships with their victims, the
court’s survey of the TVPA’s legislative history reveals no expressed intention to
preclude criminal liability in those contexts.” Id.
113. Id. at 300.
114. 546 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2008).
115. See id. (charging the defendants with violating the involuntary servitude and
forced labor statutes, health care fraud, mail fraud, and obstructing a federal audit based
on their activities surrounding the operation of the Kaufman House).
116. See id. at 1247 (appealing their convictions for forced labor and involuntary
servitude).
117. See id. at 1261 (noting that, while the authorities cited by the defendants
involved work that was economic in nature, those authorities also described slavery and
involuntary servitude in a broader fashion); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-939 (2000)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N 1380, 1393 (explaining that “[s]ection
1589 will provide federal prosecutors with tools to combat severe forms of worker
exploitation that do not rise to the level of involuntary servitude as defined in
Kozminski.”).
118. Kaufman, 546 F.3d at 1261.
119. Id. at 1262.
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C. Expanding the Concept of “Serious Harm”
Determining the meaning of the term “serious harm” was the issue in the
United States v. Bradley.120 In this case, the defendants lured two Jamaican
workers to New Hampshire to work for Bradley Tree Service, a tree
removal company. The defendants promised the workers, wages of $15-20
per hour and lodging in Bradley’s house. Instead, they were paid $7 per
hour and they were forced to stay in a camping trailer. Charges against the
defendants included a violation of § 1589.121 In defining “serious harm,”
the district court instructed the following:
The term ‘serious harm’ includes both physical and non-physical types
of harm. Therefore, a threat of serious harm includes any threats –
includes threats of any consequences, whether physical or non-physical,
that are sufficient under all of the surrounding circumstances to compel
or coerce a reasonable person in the same situation to provide or to
continue providing labor or services.122

On appeal, the defendants argued that this definition expanded the
meaning of serious harm beyond the limits contemplated by § 1589.123 The
First Circuit disagreed, reasoning that:
Section 1589 is a recent addition to the chapter that makes criminal acts
of slavery, peonage and holding to involuntary servitude, 18 U.S.C.
sections 1581-1594. Adopted in 2000 as part of a broader set of
provisions—the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000—section 1589 was intended expressly to counter United States v.
Kozminski. In Kozminski the Supreme Court had interpreted the preexisting ban on ‘involuntary servitude’ in section 1584 to prohibit only
conduct involving the use or threatened use of physical or legal
coercion.124

Additionally, in Marcus I, the court stated “Congress made clear its
intent that this statute be applied broadly in order to capture conduct that
the Supreme Court had ruled beyond the reach of the statutes prohibiting
involuntary servitude.”125
D. Determining What Constitutes Abuse of Legal Process
In United States v. Peterson,126 a federal district court in Georgia defined
120. 390 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2004) (addressing the defendant’s challenge to the
district court’s instruction defining serious harm).
121. Id. at 148-49.
122. Id. at 150.
123. See id. (challenging the jury instruction given at trial).
124. Id. (internal citations omitted).
125. 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 302 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
126. 544 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (M.D. Ga. 2008).
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the § 1589 phrase “abuse or threatened abuse of the law or legal
process.”127 The court referred to the following:
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the abuse of legal process as the
use of a legal process, either criminal or civil ‘against another primarily
to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.’ This broad
definition demonstrates that simply using the generic terms to change the
offense does not sufficiently apprise Defendant of what he must be
prepared to meet.128

In Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd.,129 a federal court in Colorado
determined that the threat of deportation for violating the immigration laws
of the United States constituted an abuse of the legal process.130 The court
stated that:
[T]he plain language of the TVPRA does not require a showing that
plaintiffs (or, in a criminal case, the victims) were actually harmed
physically. It is enough to state a claim for a violation of the TVPRA if it
is alleged that plaintiffs were forced to work by ‘threatened abuse of law
or legal process.131

The legislative history of the TVPA indicates that Congress designed §
1589 to expand criminal liability in cases not covered by § 1584
(involuntary servitude).132
Similarly, in United States v. Veerapol,133 the Ninth Circuit concluded
that “threatening . . . an immigrant with deportation could constitute the
threat of legal coercion that induces involuntary servitude, even though
such a threat made to an adult citizen of normal intelligence would be too
implausible to produce involuntary servitude.”134 As noted in the
congressional findings, § 1589 addresses “the increasingly subtle methods
of traffickers who place their victims in modern-day slavery, such as where
traffickers threaten harm to third persons, restrain their victims without
physical violence or injury, or threaten dire consequence by means other
than overt violence.”135
127. Id. at 1375 (finding that the terms are generic and not defined in the statute, so
other sources must be considered).
128. Id. (quoting in part the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 (1965)).
129. No. 06-cv-01043-WYD-MJW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567 (D. Colo. Jan. 4,
2007).
130. Id. at *24 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs’ failure to state
physical harm was detrimental to their claim).
131. Id. at *23-24.
132. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-939 (2000) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2000
U.S.C.C.A.N 1380, 1393 (indicating that § 1589 is intended to address subtle methods
of trafficking).
133. 312 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2007).
134. Id. at 1132 (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948 (1988)).
135. H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 101.
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In Ramos v. Hoyle,136 the defendants argued that “[p]laintiffs [had] failed
to state a claim under § 1589 (3) because the threat made that Plaintiffs
would lose their immigration status if they left Defendants’ employment
was a ‘truthful statement and not an abuse of legal process.’”137 The
district court disagreed, citing United States v. Garcia138 where another
district court said that “threatening [workers] with serious legal
consequences, i.e., deportation for having violated the immigration
laws . . . ‘clearly fall[s] within the concept and definition of ‘abuse of legal
process’ since the alleged objective for same was to intimidate and coerce
the workers into ‘forced labor.’”139
Furthermore, an opportunity to escape does not mean that the situation
was not one of coercion. It is sufficient that the “defendant . . . placed [the
victim] in such fear of physical harm that he [was] afraid to leave.”140
E. When Threats of Deportation Constitute Involuntary Servitude
Threats of deportation on their own do not prove involuntary servitude.
In fact, according to a federal district court in New York in Winthal v.
Mendez:
[t]hreats of deportation or future unemployment do not state a claim for
involuntary servitude. So long as ‘the servant knows he has a choice
between continued service and freedom’ he is not working involuntarily
‘even if the master had led him to believe that the choice may entail
consequences that are exceedingly bad.’141

In United States v. Shackney, the defendant operated a chicken farm and
hired a family from Mexico to work on it, promising them lodging and
compensation.
Upon arrival, however the family found the
accommodations were not what the defendant promised and the work
conditions more arduous than they anticipated. The defendant threatened
them with deportation if they broke the contract.142 The Second Circuit
found that, while a threat of deportation may have come close to violating §
1584, it still left the family with a choice.143 Adopting a narrow
136. No. 08-21809, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 102677 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2008).
137. Id. at *10-11. But see 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2006) (establishing that the truth of the

statement is irrelevant).
138. No. 02-CR-110S-01, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22088 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003).
139. Id. at *23.
140. See United States v. Warren, 772 F. 2d 827, 834 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that
threats and acts of violence created a climate of fear sufficient to prevent workers from
leaving the camp).
141. No. 76 Civ. 3161 (JMC), 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18322, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
18, 1978) (quoting United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964)).
142. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1964).
143. Id. at 486 (holding that a choice is still present, even when the consequences
are exceedingly bad).
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interpretation of § 1584, the court stated that “a holding in involuntary
servitude means to us action by the master causing the servant to have, or
to believe he has, no way to avoid continued service or confinement.”144
The court continued “[t]his seems to us a line that is intelligible and
consistent with the great purpose of the 13th Amendment; to go beyond it
would be inconsistent with the language and the history, both pointing to
the conclusion that ‘involuntary servitude’ was considered to be something
‘akin to African slavery’ although without some of the latter’s incidents.”145
The court continued:
The term involuntary servitude, in my opinion, is substantially
synonymous with slavery, though it may perhaps be regarded as slightly
more comprehensive, and as embracing everything under the name of
servitude, though not denominated slavery, which gives to one person
the control and ownership of the involuntary and compulsory services of
another against his will and consent.146

Similarly, in Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores,147 the immigrants who provided
janitorial services at the defendant’s retail stores alleged that Wal-Mart
kept them in involuntary servitude by threatening them with deportation
and forcing them to work under threats of coercion. The New Jersey
district court concluded that these allegations of involuntary servitude were
insufficient, stating that “plaintiffs have not alleged that they did not have
any way to avoid ‘continued service or confinement.’”148

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 484-85 (quoting Tyler v. Heidorn, 46 Barb. 439, 458 (Albany General

Term, 1866)); see also United States v. Pipkins (Pipkins I), 378 F. 3d 1281, 1297 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding that a conviction under § 1584 can be upheld based on keeping a
victim in involuntary servitude through fear, regardless of opportunity to escape and
duration of captivity). According to the court in Pipkins I, “A conviction under § 1584
requires proof that ‘the victim (was) forced to work for the defendant by the use or
threat of physical restraint or physical injury.’ If a defendant keeps a victim in
involuntary servitude through such fear of physical harm that the victim is afraid to
leave, regardless of any opportunity to escape, the defendant has violated 1584.” Id.
(quoting in part Kozminski). The court also ruled that “section 1584 requires that
involuntary servitude be for ‘any term’ which suggests that the temporal duration can
be slight.” Id.
147. 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005).
148. See id. at 311 (comparing the case to Shackney in that a credible threat of
deportation may come close to the line, but it still leaves the employee with a credible
choice).
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F. Indebtedness as the Basis for the Crime of Peonage149
In United States v. Farrell,150 the defendants, who owned and operated a
Comfort Inn and Suites in South Dakota, brought a number of workers
from the Philippines to work as housekeepers. The workers were
responsible for the cost of transportation to and from the United States in
violation of their contracts. They were also told that a $1,200 petitionprocessing fee for their nonimmigrant worker status would be divided
equally among them.151 The government charged the Farrells with peonage
in accordance with § 1581. The Eighth Circuit explained that peonage is
“compulsory service in payment of a debt” that resembles involuntary
servitude.152 In this case, the workers were threatened that if they
attempted to run away they would be shipped back to the Philippines. The
government presented sufficient evidence that working and living
conditions compelled the victims to serve to make the debt payments.153
The court concluded:
Given the above, a reasonable jury could have found that the
Government presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Farrells’ threats of physical force and arrest compelled the
workers to serve in order to satisfy their debts. The evidence establishes
that the workers reasonably believed that they had no option but to
continue working for the Farrells. Accordingly, the conviction for
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006) (Peonage is defined as a crime under § 1581 of
the United States Code: “Whoever holds or returns any person to a condition of
peonage, or arrests any person with the intent of placing him in or returning him to a
condition of peonage, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation
includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or the attempt to
commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.”). In 1867,
Congress passed the Anti-Peonage Act. Id. The first part of the statue stated: “The
holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is
abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States, and all
acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which
have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt
shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the
voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as persons, in liquidation of
any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.” Anti-Peonage Act of
March 2, 1867 c. 187, 14 Stat 546.
150. 563 F.3d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 2009).
151. See id. at 366.
152. See id. at 366, 372 (concluding that, to uphold the charge, “the government
must show that the defendant intentionally held a person against his will or coerced that
person to work in order to satisfy a debt by (1) physical restraint or force, (2) legal
coercion, or (3) threats of legal coercion or physical force.”) (citing Bailey v. Alabama
219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911)).
153. See id. at 368-69 (detailing the defendants’ treatment of workers, including
rules against socialization, complete control of finances, methods of intimidation and
the amplification of these factors caused by the victims special vulnerabilities and their
dependence on the Farrells for housing and transportation).
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peonage is affirmed.154

Explaining the principle that no person could secure the labor of another
by compulsion, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Booker155 stated that:
The [T]hirteenth [A]mendment and the laws that enforce it . . .
established the fundamental principle that no person could secure the
labor of another by compulsion. The statutes protected persons similarly
situated to the migrant workers of our own time. They were persons
without property and without skills save those in tending the fields. With
little education, little money and little hope, they easily fell prey to the
tempting offers of ‘powerful and unscrupulous’ individuals who would
soon assert complete control over their lives. That control might be
maintained through the threat of criminal sanctions . . . or through
physical force as practiced here.156

In United States v. Kyongja Kang,157 the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York clarified the distinction between peonage and
involuntary servitude by defining peonage as:
[A] status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the
indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. . .
Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary; but this
implies simply a difference in the mode or origin, but none in the
character of the servitude. . . But peonage, however created, is
compulsory service,—involuntary servitude. . . That which is
contemplated by the statue is compulsory service to secure the payment
of a debt.158

In other words, “[p]eonage involves the additional element that the
involuntary servitude is tied to the discharge of an indebtedness.”159
In the absence of a debt owed to the employer, the peonage statue160 does
not apply. As stated by a Pennsylvania district court in Dolla v. UniCast
Co.:161
Section 1581 makes the holding of a person in a state of peonage a
criminal offense. Peonage is a ‘condition of compulsory service based
upon indebtedness of the peon to its master.’ Peonage is a form of
involuntary servitude, and is characterized by the involuntary
performance of labor based upon indebtedness. Thus, the critical
154. Id. at 376.
155. 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981).
156. Id. at 566 (“The availability of escape, as the history of slavery has shown, or

even a situation where the discipline of terror is not constantly enforced, does not
preclude a finding that persons are held as slaves.”).
157. No. 04 CR 87(ILG), 2006 WL 208882 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2006).
158. Id. at *6-7 (quoting in part Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 215, 216 (1905)).
159. Id. (quoting Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 207).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006).
161. 930 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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elements of a peonage claim are indebtedness and compulsion.162

III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
The TVPA has been challenged on several constitutional grounds
including the Ex Post Facto Clause, congressional overreach of powers
under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the void-for-vagueness doctrine,
and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A. Application of the TVPA may not Violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the U.S. Constitution
In United States v. Paulin,163 the defendant brought a 14 year-old girl to
the U.S. from Haiti and kept her in involuntary servitude for six years, from
1999 to 2005. Although the trafficking act committed by the defendant
began in 1999, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that this conviction did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it was clearly established that the
defendant’s abuse of the victim continued for a number of years after the
effective date of the TVPA.
One successful challenge based on the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S.
Constitution,164 was the issue in United States v. Marcus (Marcus II).165
The defendant was charged with violating the TVPA between January 1999
and October 2001, and thus he argued that the TVPA had been applied
retroactively since it was not enacted until October 2000. The government
argued that sex trafficking constituted “continuing offers” and that “even
though the criminal conduct at issue began prior to enactment of the TVPA,
it continued after enactment.”166 The Second Circuit disagreed because the
jury could have convicted the defendants based exclusively on pre162. Id. at 204 (internal citations omitted).
163. United States v. Paulin, 329 F. App’x 232 (11th Cir. 2009). The girl was

forced to work long hours doing domestic duties and was not allowed to sit and eat the
meals she had prepared for the defendant’s family. Id. at 233. She was forced to sleep
on a mattress on the living room floor and to bathe outside using a bucket of cold
water. Id. She was not permitted to go to school or leave the house unaccompanied. Id.
If she objected to her treatment the defendant beat her or threatened to send her back to
Haiti. Id. at 233-34.
164. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 (“No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”).
165. 538 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2008). But see Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F.
Supp. 2d 674, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“Accordingly, the thrust of the TVPRA would be
severely undermined by a holding that U.S. defendants who gained commercial
advantage in this country through engaging in illegal human trafficking were free from
liability, so long as the trafficking acts themselves took place outside of American
borders. Therefore, the Court finds that the traditional presumption against the
retroactive application of statutes would contravene the clear purpose of the TVPRA,
and would inappropriately absolve those who could in fact be guilty of violating its
provisions.”).
166. Marcus II, 538 F.3d at 101.
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enactment conduct. In this case, the defendant engaged in several
trafficking activities: he recruited, enticed, and obtained the victim when he
met her online in late 1998, then he convinced her to come from Maryland
to New York in January 2000. In total, he was responsible for holding her
from 1999 until 2001. Only the harboring activity, not the transporting,
occurred after October 2000, the effective date of the TVPA. So the jury
concluded that although the defendant did not harbor the victim, he
recruited, enticed, or obtained her in 1998 or transported her in 2000 and
thus could have convicted the defendant based only on pre-enactment
conduct.167 The defendant argued that Congress had no power to regulate
sex trafficking where the recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting,
providing or obtaining of the trafficked person was performed intrastate,
thus § 1591 is unconstitutional.168
In United States v. Jackson,169 the defendant, a U.S. citizen, was arrested
in Cambodia on charges of debauchery after he had engaged in sex with
three Cambodian boys. While the Cambodian charge was pending, the
United States revoked the defendant’s passport and agreed to take
jurisdiction over the case. The defendant was charged with violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2423(c). The case was dismissed because this section was
enacted in April 30, 2003 and defendant’s travel had ended by April 30,
2003. So, based on the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution of the
United States,170 the statute did not apply to him. The Ninth Circuit
concluded:
[The defendant] admits to committing despicable sexual acts with
children . . . . Yet his abhorrent conduct does not give us license to
ignore the elements of the criminal statutes that Congress has
established . . . the text of section 2423(c) only proscribes the conduct of
an individual ‘who travels in foreign commerce’ after the enactment of
the statute. Because Jackson’s travel had ended by April 30, 2003, he is
not covered by the provision. The district court was therefore correct to
dismiss the indictment.171

167. Id.
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2006) (“Whoever knowingly (1) in or affecting interstate

or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means a
person, or (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of values, from
participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of
paragraph (1), knowing that force, fraud, or coercion described in subsection (c) (2)
will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person
has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex
act, shall be punished as provides in subsection (b).”).
169. 480 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2007).
170. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
171. Jackson, 480 F.3d at 1024.
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B. TVPA Affecting Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Under the Commerce Clause,172 Congress has the power to regulate
activities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce. In
determining whether a law regulates an activity that has a “substantial
effect” on interstate commerce, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut in United States v. Paris outlined four main considerations: (a)
the economic relation of the regulated activity; (b) a jurisdictional element
limiting the reach of the law to a discrete set of activities that additionally
have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce; (c)
express congressional findings regarding the affects upon which interstate
commerce of the activity in question; and (d) the link between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce.173 The court determined:
Section 1591 satisfies each of these considerations: first commercial sex
acts are economic in nature; second, section 1591 has a jurisdictional
element, requiring the jury to find that the activity affected interstate
commerce. Third, in enacting the Trafficking Victims Protection Act,
Congress found that “Trafficking in persons substantially affects
interstate and foreign commerce.” Fourth, there is a clear nexus between
(defendant’s) intrastate recruiting and obtaining of women to commit
commercial sex acts, the interstate aspects of (defendant’s) business, and
the interstate market for commercial sex.”174

In United States v. Simonson,175 the Ninth Circuit wrote that “Congress
has the power to regulate foreign commerce and to act to prevent the
channels of commerce from being used for immoral or injurious
purposes.”176 In this case, the defendant was convicted and sentenced for
intent to engage in illicit conduct and attempted enticement.177 The
defendant argued that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce
Clause178 by reading a statute in regards to conduct unrelated to commerce.
The court disagreed, holding that Congress may regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce.
In United States v. Martinez,179 the defendant, a U.S. citizen who
traveled to Mexico to have sex with a minor, argued that § 2423(c) violated

172. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
173. United States v. Paris, No. 03:06-cr-64 (CFD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78418,

at *23 (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 2007).
174. Id. at *23-24 (quoting in part 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(12) (2006)).
175. 244 F. App’x 823 (9th Cir. 2007).
176. Id. at 825-26 (quoting United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1049-51
(9th Cir. 2002)).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)-(b) (2006).
178. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
179. 599 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Tex. 2009).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

31

MATTAR 8/15/2011

10/6/2011 12:56:39 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 14

1278

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:4

the Commerce Clause.180 The Texas district court acknowledged:
[T]he alleged illicit sexual conduct in the instant case is not itself
commercial. However, a worldwide market exists for child prostitution,
an activity that is “quintessentially economic” in nature, and that falls
within foreign trade and commerce. As the optimal Protocol states, there
is both “significant and increasing international trafficking of children
for the purpose of the sale of children, child prostitution and
pornography, as well as ‘the widespread and continuing practice of sex
tourism.’”181

The PROTECT Act,182 the court observed, “is primarily designed to
combat the human suffering and economic evils of worldwide sex tourism
and child prostitution.”183
In United States v. Evans,184 the Eleventh Circuit rejected an argument
that § 1591(a)(1) of the TVPA could not constitutionally apply to his solely
intrastate behavior. The court stated:
We have no difficulty concluding that Raich,185 Maxwell,186 and Smith187
foreclose [the defendant’s] challenges to the constitutionality of section
1591(a)(1) as applied to his activity occurring solely within Florida.
Section 1591 was enacted as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act of 2000 (TVPA). Like the CSA and CPPA, the TVPA is part of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. The TVPA criminalizes and attempts
to prevent slavery, involuntary servitude, and human trafficking for
commercial gain.
Congress recognized that human trafficking,
particularly of women and children in the sex industry, “is a modern
form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today.”
Congress found that trafficking of persons has an aggregate economic
impact on interstate and foreign commerce, and we cannot say that this
180. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
181. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 807 (quoting Optional Protocol of the Convention

on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of the Children in Armed Conflict, Feb.
12, 2002, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222, at pmbl.)
182. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 151, 117 Stat. 650, 650 (2003)
(including 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006)). For a discussion of the PROTECT Act, see
generally Tracy Agyemang, Reconceptualizing Child Sexual Exploitation as a Bias
Crime Under the PROTECT Act, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 937 (2006); Maureen
Atwell, Combating American Child Sex Tourism in Cambodia Under the 2003 U.S.
PROTECT Act, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 163 (2008); Karen D. Breckenridge, Justice Beyond
Borders: A Comparison of Australian and U.S. Child-Sex Tourism Laws, 13 PAC. RIM
L. & POL’Y J. 405 (2004); Amy Fraley, Child Sex Tourism Legislation Under the
PROTECT Act: Does It Really Protect?, 79 ST JOHN’S L. REV. 445 (2005); Stephanie
L. Mariconda, Breaking the Chains: Combating Human Trafficking at the State Level,
29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 151 (2009).
183. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 807-08.
184. 476 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2007).
185. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
186. United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006).
187. United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006).
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finding is irrational.188

The defendant was charged and convicted for enticing a minor to engage
in a commercial sex act in violation of § 1591(a)(1) and enticing a minor to
engage in prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The defendant
operated a child prostitution ring in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The
court concluded that the defendant’s enticement of the victim to commit
prostitution, “even though his actions occurred solely in Florida, had that
capacity when considered in the aggregate with similar conduct by others,
to frustrate Congress’s broader regulation of interstate and foreign
economic activity.”189 The court supported the district court’s findings that
“while [the defendant’s] activities may be minor in the national and
international market of trafficking children for commercial sex acts, his
acts contribute to the market that Congress’s comprehensive scheme seeks
to stop.”190 The court concluded that the defendant’s use of hotels that
served interstate travelers and distribution of condoms191 that traveled in
interstate commerce “is further evidence that [the defendant’s] conduct
substantially affected interstate commerce.”192 The court rejected the
defendant’s argument that the term “knowingly” modifies the interstate
commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and that the government was
therefore required to prove that the defendant knew that his actions where
in or affecting interstate foreign commerce. The court said:
We are unaware of any court that has adopted the narrow reading of §
1591(a) urged by [the defendant]. Nor is there anything in the legislative
history of section 1591 suggesting that Congress intended the statute to
reach only sex traffickers who knew they were acting in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce. . . . Accordingly, we reject [defendant’s]
request to construe § 1591(a) as requiring knowledge by a defendant that
his actions are in or affecting interstate commerce.193

The defendant’s argument that the government did not establish the
commerce element under § 2422(b) was also rejected.194 The defendant
argued that although he admitted using both a cellular telephone and a
188.
189.
190.
191.

Evans, 476 F.3d at 1179.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1179-80 (taking specific note of United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281,
1295 (11th Cir. 2004), which held that evidence of pimps furnishing their prostitutes
with condoms that were manufactured out of state supports a finding that the activities
of the enterprise affected interstate commerce).
192. Id. at 1179.
193. Id. at 1180 n.2.
194. Id. at 1180; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006) (imposing punishment on
anyone who “using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign
commerce . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who
has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution . . . .”).
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landline telephone to entice the minor female to engage in prostitution, no
evidence was presented that his intrastate calls were routed through
interstate channels. The court cited several cases, all of which support the
ability of Congress to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce195 focusing particularly on activities involving the use of
telephones and cellular phones, which are instrumentalities of interstate
commerce196 even in instances involving purely intrastate calls.197 In
United States v. Todd,198 the Ninth Circuit concluded that sex trafficking
was conducted by advertising across state lines and therefore affected
interstate commerce.
C. Applying the Vagueness Doctrine to Trafficking in Persons Statutes
Challenging § 1589 on constitutional grounds was the central issue in
United States v. Calimlim.199 In this case, Irma Martinez, at the age of 19,
left the Philippines to work as a domestic servant for the defendants. Upon
her arrival, they confiscated her passport and told her that she had to pay
the cost of her transportation. She was also told that she was in the United
States illegally. As a live-in housekeeper, she cared for their children and
household. The defendants restricted her movement: she was only allowed
to go to church. She was allowed to speak with her family only four or five
times over the 19 years she was serving the defendants and for the duration
of her work, she was only allowed to send them about $19,000. She was
constantly reminded that if she was discovered, she could be arrested and
deported. The defendants argued that the forced labor statute 1589 was so
vague that it failed to provide them with notice of the subject of
criminalization. The Seventh Circuit disagreed stating that “even if the
[defendants] did not know for certain that they would be convicted, the
language of the statute alerted them to what was prohibited.”200 The court
195. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
196. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v.

Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2004).
197. See United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v.
Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 1999).
198. 627 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 2010).
199. 538 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2008).
200. Id. at 711. The court continued, “They knew that they were telling Martinez
that if she did not do everything they asked, they would not send money back home for
her. The Calimlims also knew that not sending money back home was, for Martinez, a
‘serious harm.’ The Calimins also warned Martinez about her precarious position
under the immigration laws, conveniently omitting anything about their own
vulnerability.” Id. The court went on to say that “the statute does not specify that the
‘serious harm’ be at the defendant’s hands. It requires that the plan be ‘intended to
cause the [victim] to believe that’ that harm will befall her . . . . This subsection
describes a more indirect form of threat than that covered by section 1589(1), which
criminalized direct ‘threats of serious harm to [the victim] or another person.’ Taken as
a whole, the statute provides ample notice that it prohibits intentionally creating the
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then addressed the other ground for vagueness by stating that:
A statute may also be unconstitutionally vague when an ambiguity
allows for arbitrary enforcement of the law beyond what Congress
intended. A statute is vague in this sense when “there is [a] lack of
clarity . . . that would give law enforcement officials discretion to pull
within the statutes activities not within Congress’ intent. With reference
to section 1589, after the Supreme Court ruled that a similar statute
involving involuntary servitude, 18 U.S.C. § 1584, prohibited only
servitude procured by threats of physical harm, Congress enacted section
1589 . . . . The language of section 1589 covers nonviolent coercion, and
that is what the indictment accused the [defendants] of doing; there was
nothing arbitrary in applying the statute that way.201

Again, §§ 1589, 1584 and 1590 were challenged on constitutional
grounds in United States v. Ramos-Ramos.202 The sections under which the
defendant was charged203 state that “if the violation includes . . . aggravated
sexual abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse . . . the
defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years
or life, or both.”204 The defendant in the case argued that none of these
statutes defines aggravated sexual abuse. The U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Michigan noted that “[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine
requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement”205 The court concluded that “the absence of a definition for
‘aggravated sexual abuse’ in the human trafficking statutes does not render
the human trafficking statutes or their punishment provisions void for
vagueness.”206
belief that serious harm is possible, either at the defendant’s hands or those of others.”
Id.
201. Id. at 711-12.
202. No. 1:07-CR-08, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36452 (W.D. Mich. May 18, 2007).
203. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584, 1589, 1590 (2006).
204. Ramos-Ramos, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36452, at *5 n.2.
205. Id. at *5 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
206. Id. at *18. The court agreed with the government that “the Sexual Abuse Act
of 1986, 18 U.S.C §§ 2241-2248, which contains definitions of sexual abuse offenses,
has conferred upon the term ‘aggravated sexual abuse’ a ‘commonly accepted
meaning’ or an ‘established meaning’ within the context of federal criminal law
sufficient to provide a criminal defendant with adequate notice.” Id. at *17-18. The
court reasoned that “[t]o the extent there is any ambiguity in the term ‘aggravated
sexual abuse,’ it makes sense to look to the Federal Sexual Abuse Act for a definition
of the term as it is used in another federal criminal statute. The court is satisfied that
the term ‘aggravated sexual abuse’ provides a person of ordinary intelligence with
reasonable notice of prohibited conduct and is sufficiently particularized in light of
federal criminal statutes defining the term to insure that the provision is not enforced in
an arbitrary manner.” Id. at *18.
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Similarly, in United States v. Garcia,207 the defendant claimed that §
1589 was unconstitutional because of its vagueness, claiming that:
The use of the terms “obtains,” “threats of serious harm to or physical
restraint” and “means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal
process” in section 1589 “are not . . . anywhere defined” and therefore,
such terms as used “make it impossible for a lay person, let alone an
attorney or judge, to determine what conduct is prohibited.”208

Here, the defendant transported victims from Mexico to New York and
subjected them to overcrowded working conditions, refused to allow them
to leave, did not pay them, threatened them with physical violence and
deportation, and told them that they must work to pay off their debts. The
court, a federal district court in New York, stated that “[t]he Constitution
does not require the legislation to incorporate Webster’s Dictionary into
each statute in order to insulate it from vagueness and challenges.”209 The
court concluded that “[t]he words used in section 1589 are common words”
and “the likelihood that anyone would not understand any of those common
words seems quite remote.”210 The words and phrases cited by the
defendant have a plain and unambiguous meaning.”
The term “commercial sex act” was challenged as void for vagueness in
United States v. Paris “because it is broad enough to encompass even
legitimate modeling or acting in a romantic movie. Section 1591 defines
‘commercial sex act’ as ‘any sex act, on account of which anything of
value is given or received by any person,’ but does not define ‘any sex
act.’”211 The court disagreed, finding “overwhelming evidence of sexual
intercourse.”212
D. When do Multiple Trafficking Crimes Violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
In United States v. Maka,213 the defendant was charged with smuggling
and harboring aliens.214 The defendant claimed that the human trafficking
counts were multiplicitous of the involuntary servitude counts, thus,
charging him with both crimes violated the double jeopardy clause of the

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

No. 02-CR-110S-01, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22088 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003).
Id. at *17.
Id. at *19 (quoting Dennis v. Poppel, 222 F.3d 1245, 1260 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Id. (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)).
United States v. Paris, No. 03:06-CR-64 (CFD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78418,
at *38 (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 2007).
212. Id. at *40-41.
213. 237 F. App’x 225 (9th Cir. 2007).
214. See id. (violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1590, 1584, 1324 (2006)).
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Fifth Amendment.215 Similarly, the defendant claimed that the human
trafficking charges were multiplicitous of the alien smuggling and
harboring counts. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding:
The human trafficking counts are not multiplicitous of the involuntary
servitude counts, as each requires proof of a fact that the other does not.
Under section 1584, the defendant had to actually hold another to
involuntary servitude, something not required for a conviction under
section 1590, which requires knowledge that the laborer will be used by
someone for such purposes, but does not require that the recruiter or
transporter be that person. Likewise, a conviction under section 1590
requires proof that defendant recruited, transported, harbored or
otherwise obtained the laborer with the knowledge he or she would be
used in involuntary servitude, whereas an “end-user” defendant could be
convicted under section 1584 even if not involved in the acquisition or
transportation process.216

Based upon this explanation, the court concluded that charging and
sentencing the defendant did not violate the Fifth Amendment. The court
also concluded that:
The section 1590 human trafficking charges were not multiplicitous of
the alien smuggling and harboring counts. The alien smuggling and
harboring statute, section 1324, does not require that the smuggling or
harboring be with the intent to use the individual for “labor or services”
as required by section 1590. Section 1590 does not differentiate between
trafficking aliens and trafficking United States citizens, whereas section
1324 requires proof the person smuggled or harbored was an
unauthorized alien. Again, because each offense requires proof of a fact
the other does not, the offenses are not multiplicitous.217

E. Rejecting the Unconstitutionality of the International Marriage Broker
Regulation Act
In European Connections & Tours, Inc. v. Gonzales,218 the plaintiff
argued that the International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005
(IMBRA)219 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection provision220
because it distinguishes between international marriage brokers and other
matchmaking services. In this case, the defendant, European Connections,

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Maka, 237 F. App’x at 227.
Id.
480 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
Passed as part of the Violence against Women and Department of Justice
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 831, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
220. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of this argument, see Lindee, supra
note 106.
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operated websites facilitating contact between American men and foreign
women mainly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The
male clients of European Connections paid membership fees and other fees
for various services but the women did not, leading to a situation of
commodification of the women. Information provided by the clients was
not disclosed by European Connections, including information relating to
the potential dangerousness of the male clients. Male and female clients
were permitted to communicate with one another via European
Connections computer servers and Russian matchmaking agencies were
responsible for translating these communications.
IMBRA requires international marriage brokers (IMBs) to collect
information on the client and disclose it to the prospective bride.221 The
law, however, exempts dating services and “traditional matchmaking
organization[s] of a cultural or religious nature.”222
The plaintiff argued that the law violates the free speech protection of
the First Amendment. The court disagreed, stating:
‘Commercial speech’ entitled to First Amendment protection is limited
to communications about the availability and characteristics of products,
services, and communications which are intended to propose a
commercial transaction . . . In the instant case, IMBRA does not
regulate commercial speech. IMBs are not restricted from touting
services. Nowhere in the IMBRA statute are there any provisions
attempting to regulate the content of IMB’s commercial messages in
which they tout their respective services in an attempt to induce
commercial transactions. Instead IMBRA requires the IMBs merely to
perform a transmittal role. This is not commercial speech.223

221. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, § 831. Required disclosure includes: (1) Temporary or permanent civil
protection orders or restraining orders issued against the United States client; (2)
Arrests of convictions of the United States client for, inter alia, homicide, assault,
domestic violence, sexual assault, torture, trafficking, kidnapping or stalking; (3)
Arrests or convictions of the United States client for engaging in prostitution,
attempting to promote prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitution, or
receiving the proceeds of prostitution; (4) Arrests or convictions of the United States
client for offenses related to controlled substances or alcohol; (5) Marital history of the
United States client; (6) The ages of any of the United States client’s children who are
under the age of 18; (7) All states and countries in which the United States client has
resided since the client was 18 years of age. Id.
222. 18 U.S.C. § 833(e)(4)(B)(i) (2006).
223. European Connections, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70. The court distinguished
between “outright bans” on commercial speech and disclosure requirements, saying
that “thus, IMBRA regulates a part of a commercial transaction that does not involve
any advertising or commercial claims but instead concerns the release of private
information in order to protect the health and safety of foreign women.” Id. at 1371.
Disclosure requirements are subject to minimal security: “[t]he state’s asserted interest
here is in protecting female clients of IMBs from fraud, deception and abuse by the
United States male clients who utilize IMBs to market themselves as desirable mates.
This interest constitutes a legitimate governmental interest, which is advanced by the
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The other constitutional challenge was based on equal protection.
Because the law excludes organizations that do not target relationships
between American men and foreign women as the principle part of its
business (the IMBRA does not regulate relationships between American
citizens), as well as cultural and religious organizations, European
Connections argued that they were facing unconstitutional discrimination.
In upholding of the “rational basis” for the law’s classifications, the
court stated that:
Cultural and religious non-profits are not targeted by IMBRA for
regulation because, like non-profits, such entities lack the same
customer-centric motivations that commercial IMBs possess. Congress
reasonably could assume that without the motivations to keep its male
customers satisfied, traditional religious and cultural matchmaking
agencies are not as likely to be complicit in developing abusive
relationships. Furthermore, Congress simply had no statistical or other
evidence that traditional cultural or religious marriage brokers contribute
significantly to the harm Congress seeks to address—domestic abuse and
human trafficking.224

As to matchmaking organizations addressing domestic clients, the court
said:
The distinction between those dating services whose principal business is
providing international dating services as opposed to domestic service is
clear, Congress sought not to regulate all dating services but to protect
foreign women, who it found to be particularly vulnerable to harm from
this industry, from potentially violent American men. Congress
rationally sought to regulate only those businesses whose main function
is to facilitate these international matches rather than painting all dating
services with a broad brush.225

IV. THE TVPA DOES NOT OVERRIDE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
A. Applying the Forced Labor Statute to Trafficking for the Purpose of
disclosure requirements.” Id. at 1371-72. Plaintiff argued that there is no link between
the patronization of prostitutes and domestic abuse, and that therefore the law’s
requirement to disclose relevant prostitution convictions was overly broad. Id. at 1373.
The court disagreed stating: “one reason why IMBRA requires the disclosure of
prostitution related offenses is that such questions are asked on the non-immigrant
petition and such offenses are a ground of inadmissibility under the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Prostitution related disclosures are also mandated under IMBRA to
ascertain information which is potentially relevant to the issue of human trafficking.”
Id. at 1374 (internal citations omitted).
224. Id. at 1378.
225. Id. at 1379. In American Online Dating Ass’n v. Gonzales, the court rejected a
TRO and eventually dismissed claims under equal protection and freedom of speech.
No.
3:06-CV-123
(S.D.
Ohio
May
25,
2006),
available
at
http://www.veteransabroad.com/denied.pdf. See generally Lindee, supra note 106.
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Domestic Service
Many instances of trafficking in persons occur due to the demand for
workers within the home. These domestic workers often clean the house,
care for children and perform other domestic duties. These are particularly
egregious cases as it is frequently the women, who are traditionally in
charge of domestic affairs, commit the trafficking offenses.226
Trafficking for the purpose of domestic service was one of the offenses
that Congress intended to reach by enacting § 1589. As stated in the House
Conference Report:
[I]t is intended that prosecutors will be able to bring more cases in which
individuals have been trafficked into domestic service, an increasingly
common occurrence, not only where such victims are kept in service
through overt beatings, but also where the traffickers use more subtle
means designed to cause their victims to believe that serious harm will
result to themselves or others if they leave.227

In United States v. Djoumessi,228 the Sixth Circuit rejected the
defendant’s argument that the victim’s labor was voluntary because the
conditions were better than those she would have encountered in her own
country. The victim was a 14 year-old girl from Cameroon who worked as
a domestic worker for defendants. She was promised education in
exchange for performing housekeeping tasks for the defendants and their
two young children, but was never sent to school. She was constantly
beaten and sexually abused on several occasions. The court reasoned that:
[A] slave master cannot escape the clutches of section 1584 by
contending that he subjected the servant to slightly less wretched
conditions than she would have experienced elsewhere. Involuntary
servitude is a fixed prohibition, not a relative one. It thus sweeps up all
forced labor, even when the victim is freed from the bondages of one bad
relationship and placed in another.229

Still, while the husband may not participate in the abuse committed by
his wife towards the victim in cases of forced labor for domestic service, it
is enough that he is aware of his wife’s actions and the victim’s condition
to be held liable for conspiracy to commit the crimes of forced labor under
article 1581 and document servitude in accordance with article 1589. This
226. See, e.g., Ramos v. Texas, No. 13-06-00646-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7837
(Tex. App. Oct. 8, 2009) (nothing that the female defendant’s husband arranged for a
housekeeper to be smuggled illegally into Texas, forced her to work mostly without
pay, and threatened her with deportation if she did not work). For the Texas law, see
TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 20A.02 (West 2011).
227. H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2000
U.S.C.C.A.N 1380.
228. 538 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2008).
229. Id. at 553.
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was the case in United States v. Sabhnani.230 In this case, the victims
traveled to the United States from Indonesia to work as domestic servants
for the defendants who locked up their passports and made them work long
hours under difficult working conditions. The Second Circuit found that
although he did not personally abuse the victim, the husband possessed
sufficient knowledge to be liable as a secondary offender. In relation to the
charge of conspiracy, the Court specifically held that:
[T]he evidence is ample that Mahender assisted his wife in bringing the
maids to his home, that he did so to benefit from their labor, which he
helped to direct, and that, knowing of his wife’s threats and punishments,
he aided her in meting them out. This evidence provides more than a
sufficient basis on which to conclude that there was a “tacit
understanding” between Mahender and Varsha that the maids would be
held in involuntary servitude and peonage in the Sabhnanis’ home.231

In United States v. Udeozor,232 the Fourth Circuit admitted evidence of
defendant’s ex-husband’s rape of the victim (a 14 year-old girl) who had
left her home country of Nigeria. The victim worked as a servant for the
defendant and was beaten, abused and denied basic rights as a worker. The
court held that:
[T]o rule this evidence inadmissible outright would create problems of
its own. Sexual coercion and subordination have been among the worst
indicia of involuntary servitude. To reverse the trial court’s admission of
such evidence here would draw us closer to an inadvisable rule of per se
inadmissibility with respect to a badge and incident of servitude, which
is distressingly common, not just historically, but for young women who
find themselves in coercive circumstances today.233

The court concluded that the defendant “was part of a conspiracy that
substituted for a promised education and compensation a regime of
psychological cruelty and physical coercion that took some of the best
years of a young girl’s life. For that, involuntary servitude is not too strong
a term.”234
B. Diplomatic Immunity as a Shield Against Prosecution in Cases of
Trafficking in Persons
Several times, the United States has uncovered trafficked women and
children performing domestic service for foreign diplomats who were

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 244.
515 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 266.
Id. at 272.
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protected by diplomatic immunity.235 When the defendant is a diplomat
working in the United States, he or she may be protected by diplomatic
immunity as was the case in Sabbithi v. Al Saleh.236
[P]laintiffs worked for the defendant and his wife in Kuwait for a period
ranging from five and a half years to eight and a half months. In Kuwait,
plaintiffs allegedly worked seven days a week, for long hours each day,
and were paid between 35 Kuwaiti Dinar (KD) (approximately 121 U.S.
dollars) and 40 KD (approximately 138 U.S. dollars) per month.237

The defendants signed a contract before coming to the United States
promising to pay the plaintiffs $1,314 dollars per month but they failed to
comply with the provisions of the contract and instead sent wages of 70 KD
(approximately 242 U.S. dollars) to 100 KD (approximately 346 U.S.
dollars) per month to their families overseas. In addition, the plaintiffs’
passports were taken away from them and they were threatened with
physical harm. Finally, on January 18, 2007, they escaped.238 The
plaintiffs argued that “human trafficking is a profitable commercial activity
that results in severe human rights violations”239 and that bringing plaintiffs
from Kuwait to the United States to work as domestic servants constituted
human trafficking and thus was a commercial activity which is an
exception to diplomatic immunity. The court disagreed, holding that
“hiring household help is incidental to the daily life of a diplomat and
therefore not commercial for the purposes of the exception to the Vienna
Convention.”240 The court concluded that “the TVPA does not override
diplomatic immunity . . . . [T]he TVPA is silent as to whether it limits the
immunity of diplomats, and courts should not read a statute to modify the
United States’s [sic] treaty obligations in the absence of a clear statement
from Congress.”241 The court did recognize that foreclosing the plaintiffs’
access to the courts may have harsh implications, including even the denial
of legal or monetary relief. According to the court:
The application of the doctrine of diplomatic immunity inevitably
‘deprives others of remedies for harm they have suffered.’ . . . Congress,
however, is the appropriate body for plaintiffs to present their concerns
that the effectiveness of enforcing fair labor practices in the United

235. See Amy Tai, Comment, Unlocking the Doors to Justice: Protecting the Rights
and Remedies of Domestic Workers in the Face of Diplomatic Immunity, 16 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 175 (2007).
236. 605 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2009).
237. Id. at 125.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 127.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 130.
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States is compromised by diplomatic immunity.242

In Baoanan v. Baja,243 the plaintiff accused a former diplomat and his
wife of luring the plaintiff from the Philippines on the pretense of working
as a nurse in the United States, but upon her arrival forced her to act as a
domestic servant. A federal court in New York upheld the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), which grants immunity only
for “acts performed in the exercise of a diplomat’s functions as a member
of the mission.”244
C. From Prosecution to Prevention: A Significant Amendment of the TVPA
To avoid the difficulty of prosecuting a diplomat, the TVPRA 2008
resorts to a preventative measure, namely, the limiting of the issuance of A3 and G-5 visas. The Act provides that:
[T]he Secretary shall suspend, for such period as the Secretary
determines necessary, the issuance of A-3 visas or G-5 visas to
applicants seeking to work for officials of a diplomatic mission or an
international organization, if the Secretary determines that there is
credible evidence that 1 or more employees of such mission or
international organization have abused or exploited 1 or more
nonimmigrants holding an A-3 visa or a G-5 visa, and that the
diplomatic mission or international organization tolerated such
actions.245

Another significant change in the TVPRA 2008 is the introduction of §
236, which stipulates that the U.S. government will revoke the passport of
an individual convicted of participating in international sex tourism.246

242. Id.
243. 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“There are narrow exceptions to

this diplomatic immunity, which are articulated in Article 31: A diplomatic agent shall
enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also
enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: (a)
A real action relating to private immovable property . . . ; (b) An action relating to
succession . . . ; (c) An action relation to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.”).
244. Id.
245. TVPRA 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 203(a)(2), 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).
246. Id. § 236 (stating that the U.S. Secretary of State will not issue a passport to an
individual convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423, if the individual used a passport or
passport card or otherwise crossed an international border in committing the offense).
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V. WHEN DOES THE TVPA APPLY ON AN EXTRATERRITORIAL BASIS?
A. Transnationality of the Crime of Trafficking Requires Special Discovery
Procedures
The transnational nature of many trafficking cases poses particular
challenges for the plaintiffs, who must gather evidence and testimony from
foreign jurisdictions, as exemplified in Cruz v. Toliver:
[C]laims of forced labor and trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1589 and 18
U.S.C. § 1590 required more time, effort and research to address than the
FLSA claim . . . . The Plaintiff’s counsel not only had to conduct
discovery here in the United States, but also had to go abroad to take
discovery in order to submit the claim under those statutes.247

Because of these additional burdens, the court allowed for the award of
additional attorney’s fees. Furthermore, the prosecution of a case of
trafficking in persons may require international cooperation between the
country of origin and the country of destination, which may prolong the
trial. In United States v. Maksimenko (Maksimenko I),248 both of the
Ukrainian defendants were charged with obtaining labor and services from
Ukrainian women in the U.S. through the use of threats and physical
restraints in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589. The court granted the
government’s motion for continuance for five months so that it could
obtain information from Ukraine. The court found that the five-month
period was not excessive and did not trigger the application of the
Constitutional right to a speedy trial.249 The U.S. government submitted a
request to the government of Ukraine pursuant to the treaty on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, but processing that request took a
significant amount of time.
B. Early Rejection of the Extraterritorial Application of the TVPA
Trafficking in persons is a transnational crime that requires transnational
responses, including the recognition of the crime as an extraterritorial
offense. In 2000, the TVPA did not explicitly provide for the principle of
extraterritoriality.
In Nattah v. Bush,250 the D.C. District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s
247. Cruz v. Toliver, No. 5:04CV-231-R, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24468, at *8
(W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007).
248. No. 05-80187, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35087, at *1, *9 (E.D. Mich. June 25,
2005).
249. United States v. Aronov, No. 05-80187, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45615, at *1
(E.D. Mich. 2007); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting the right to a speedy and
public trial to criminal defendants).
250. 541 F. Supp. 2d 223, 233 (D.D.C. 2008).
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slavery claim. The court stated: “To the extent that Plaintiff’s story relies
upon the Thirteenth Amendment, that amendment does not in itself create
or promote right of action.”251 The court continued, “similarly, the plaintiff
fails to provide a basis for his slavery claim under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (‘TVPA’).”252 The court referred to Roe v. Bridgestone
Corp.,253 in which a lower federal court in Indiana concluded that 18
U.S.C. § 1589 did not apply extraterritorially to conditions on a Liberian
rubber plantation and that the plaintiff could not maintain a civil claim
pursuant to the civil cause of action created by section 1595.254 The court
in Nattah said:
The section 1589 ban on forced labor is not such an instance. That
section contains no express indication of intent to create extraterritorial
effect . . . [and] [t]his court finds no explicit Congressional intent to
create a civil cause of action for conduct occurring wholly outside of the
United States.255

In Bridgestone, the plaintiffs were workers who tapped rubber trees on
the Bridgestone rubber plantation in Liberia. The plantation workers were
denied basic living conditions, including food and decent accommodations,
and minor workers were forced to do hazardous work with their fathers in
order to meet the required quota of tapped trees. Whether the TVPA has an
extraterritorial effect was one of the issues raised by the plaintiffs. The
court concluded that “[t]he Thirteenth Amendment bans slavery and
involuntary servitude only ‘within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction.’ By its terms, that language does not appear to reach
251. Id. at 234.
252. See id. at 234-35 (“Further, plaintiff cites several statutes in Title 18 of the

United States Code [including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590], that he
asserts create a private right of action to enforce the 13th Amendment. Generally
speaking, these statutes create criminal liability for enticement into forced labor, sale
into slavery, and use or provision of forced labor; they do not create an independent
means of asserting a private action. However, 18 U.S.C. § 1595 expressly provides for
a civil remedy for victims of violations of §§ 1589, 1590 and 1591. Yet, there is no
indication that § 1595 provides any remedy for alleged violations of the three statutes
that occur outside the United States. The court thus finds that Nattah’s proposed
extraterritorial application of these statutes is improper.”).
253. 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
254. Id. at 999-1004; see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991) (“It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.’”).
255. Nattah, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 235 n.11. Later in the case, the court addressed
another tactic of the plaintiff: “Although each of these statutes applies only to
territories or states of the United States, plaintiff claims that Iraq should be considered
a United States territory for some or all of his period of captivity because ‘the United
States invasion of Iraq in 2003 overthrew and completely replaced the Iraqi
government . . . and treated and acted as though Iraq was a protectorate and/or
colony.’ . . . There is simply no authority for the proposition that Iraq is a United States
territory for the purposes of plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 235 (internal citations omitted).
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activity in other countries.”256 The court then stated that section 1589 of
the act “does not provide a remedy for alleged violations of section 1589’s
standards that occur outside the United States.”257 The plaintiffs argued
that the TVPA, of which section 1589 is a part, “also includes an array of
measures to counteract forced labor and trafficking in persons, including
provisions for activities overseas.”258 The court disagreed, stating that
“[t]he international dimensions of the problems of trafficking and forced
labor do not support a departure from the usual presumption against
extraterritorial application for section 1589 . . . . Congress knows how to
legislate with extraterritorial effect in this field. It has done so expressly
when it has intended to do so.”259

256.
257.
258.
259.

Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend XIII).
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1002 (referring to the first federal anti-slavery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1586,
passed by Congress in 1800, which provided that “[w]hoever, being a citizen or
resident of the United States, voluntarily serves on board of any vessel employed or
made use of the transportation of slaves from any foreign country or place to another,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both”). The
court concluded that § 1589, unlike § 1591 which Congress expanded based on its
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, stems from the Thirteenth
Amendment, unlike the sex tourism statute. See, e.g., United States v. Yakoob, No. 0720084, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 562, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2008). In Yakoob, the
defendant was charged with attempt to coerce a minor to commit illegal sexual activity
in violation of § 2422(b) and travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct in
violation of § 2423(b)). Id. at *1. The defendant, a Canadian citizen permanently
residing in Michigan, traveled to a shopping mall in Ontario, Canada to meet who he
thought was a thirteen year-old girl. Id. The girl was in fact a law enforcement agent
who engaged in a series of sexually explicit conversations in internet chat rooms with
the defendant. Id. The defendant argued that the statute does not apply
extraterritorially. Id. at *2. The court disagreed, holding that “[t]he statute
criminalizes travel in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual
conduct, as (defendant) did. The language of the statute clearly contemplates
extraterritorial application, and such application does not run afoul of international law
or due process or exceed Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce Clause.” Id.
at 6.
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C. Statutory Amendment of the TVPA to Apply on Extraterritorial Basis260
The TVPRA 2005 came into force in 2007. After the passage of the
TVPRA, the Uniform Code of Military Justice was amended in October of
2007, creating a new offense of “forcible pandering.”261 The amendment
was designed to respond to the issue of forced prostitution. The new
offense requires: (a) that the accused compelled a certain person to engage
in an act of prostitution; and (b) that the accused directed another person to
said person, who then engages in an act of prostitution.
Prior to this, in 2000, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
(MEJA)262 extended criminal liability to civilians working for the United
States abroad and criminalizing contractors “employed by or
accompanying” the U.S. armed forces for offenses that under U.S. law
would be considered felonies punishable by at least one year of prison. In
2004, MEJA extended its scope of application to contractors of any federal
agency “to the extent such employment related to supporting the mission of
the Department of Defense overseas.”263
The original version of MEJA did not provide for any extraterritorial
application, nor did the TVPRA 2003. Instead, the TVPRA 2003 stated
that:
[A]ny grant, contract, or cooperative agreement provided or entered into
by a federal department or agency under which funds are to be provided
by a private entity shall be included a condition that authorizes the
department or cooperative agreement, without penalty, if the grantee or
any sub-grantee, or the contractor or any subcontractor (i) engages in

260. For a discussion of the relationship between international norms and domestic
law, see generally Philip M. Moreman, National Court Decisions as State Practice: A
Transnational Judicial Dialogue?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 259 (2006)
(discussing the relationship between international norms and domestic law); AnneMarie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 192 (2003)
(describing the scope of transnational litigation); Melissa A. Waters, Justice Scalia on
the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: Unidirectional Monologue or
Co-Constitutive Dialogue, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 149, 150-51 (2004) (pointing
to the growing trend and criticism of the Supreme Court’s use of international law in its
decisions and the Court’s reluctance to enter the debate during its 2003-2004 term);
Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 490 (2005)
(arguing that domestic courts play a dual role, as both international norm internalizers
and norm creators, resulting in the passive acceptance of international law into
domestic law).
261. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006). See generally
Margaret Maffai, Accountability for Private Military and Security Company Employees
that Engage in Sex Trafficking and Related Abuses While Under Contract with the
United States Overseas, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1095, 1109 (2009) (listing the requirements
for classifying an act as “forcible pandering” and analyzing the problems in the
statutory language).
262. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2006).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (2006).
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severe forms of trafficking in persons or have procured a commercial sex
act during the period of time that the grant, contract, or cooperative
agreement is in effect, or (ii) uses forced labor in the performances if the
grant, contract or cooperative agreement.264

However, in 2005, the TVPA was amended to include an extraterritorial
application in cases involving civilian employees of the United States in a
foreign country. Section 2371 of the act provides:
Whoever, while employed by or accompanying the federal government
outside the United States, engages in conduct outside the United States,
that would constitute any offense under this title if the conduct has been
engaged in within the United States or within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States should be punished as
provided for that offense.265

Consequently, TVPRA 2005 expanded U.S. criminal jurisdiction for
offenses committed by U.S. government personnel and contractors in a
foreign country in cases in which they are involved in trafficking in persons
activities.266
Finally, in 2008, Congress decided to apply the Act on an extraterritorial
basis for all of the crimes that are covered under the Act.267
VI. INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL LAW ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
INTO U.S. COURTS
A. The TVPA as an Implementation of the U.N. Protocol on Trafficking: A
Comparison
The U.N. Protocol, which was passed in 2000, represents an
international consensus that trafficking in persons should be criminalized,
264. TVPRA 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 3, 177 Stat. 2875 (2003).
265. TVPRA 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–164, § 2371, 119 Stat. 3558 (2005).
266. See id. (including criminal offenses committed by federal contractors outside

the United States as a crime under § 3271 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which
states that “[w]hoever, while an extraterritorial Federal contractor, engages in conduct
outside the United States that would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment
for more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be punished as provided for that
offense.”).
267. See id. § 223(a) (specifying in Section 223, titled Jurisdiction in Certain
Trafficking Offenses, that chapter 77 of Title of the United States Code should be
amended by adding “Sec. 1596. Additional jurisdiction in certain trafficking offenses:
(a) In General—In addition to any domestic or extra-territorial jurisdiction otherwise
provided by law, the courts of the United States have extra-territorial jurisdiction over
any offense (or any attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense) under section 1581,
1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591 if—(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as those terms are defined
in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)); or (2) an
alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the
alleged offender.”).
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acts of trafficking should be prevented, and victims of trafficking should be
protected.268 The United States ratified the U.N. Protocol on November 3,
2005. In comparison with the U.N. Protocol, the TVPA’s definition of
trafficking in persons is narrow in scope in several ways. In particular, the
TVPA’s operational provisions are limited to severe forms of trafficking.269
In addition, the U.N. Protocol recognizes more forms of trafficking.270 The
focus in the TVPA is on the illegal means, while the U.N. Protocol
emphasizes the exploitation of workers. In cases of trafficking in persons
other than children, the TVPA requires proof of force, fraud, or coercion.
Consequently, these “illegal means” are narrowly defined under the Act.
The U.N. Trafficking Protocol adopts a more expansive definition that
includes “threat, or use of force, or other means of coercion, of abduction,
of fraud, of deception, of abuse of power, or of a position of
vulnerability.”271 According to this more comprehensive definition of
“illegal means,” the use of force, fraud, or coercion is not required.272 It
should be noted, however, that the UN Protocol and the TVPA adopt
substantially similar standards for the elimination of human trafficking.273
The TVPA is essentially an implementation of article 5 of the U.N.
268. U.N. Protocol, supra note 79, at 31.
269. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 103(8), 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (defining

“[s]evere forms of trafficking in persons” as “(A) sex trafficking in which a
commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person
induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or (B) the recruitment,
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services,
through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary
servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.”).
270. U.N. Protocol, supra note 79, at art. 3(a) (defining trafficking in persons as “the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs”).
271. Id. (defining a position of vulnerability as “any situation in which the person
involved has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved”).
272. Id. at art. (3)(b) (stating that consent, “expressed by a person in such vulnerable
condition, is irrelevant” and thus when the victim performs the work or service
voluntarily it should not affect the outcome of the case).
273. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, 2011 16 (2011)
(“The Trafficking in Persons Report monitors countries’ anti-trafficking standards set
forth in the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 . . . not the . . . Palermo
Protocol, which supplements the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime. The standards in the TVPA, however, are largely consistent with the framework
for addressing trafficking set forth in the Palermo Protocol, both in form and in content.
Both define trafficking in persons as a set of acts, means, and purposes. Both
emphasize the use of force, fraud, or coercion to obtain the services of another person.
And both acknowledge that movement is not required, framing the crime around the
extreme exploitation that characterizes this form of abuse.”).
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Protocol which requires states to adopt specific anti-trafficking legislation
making the act of trafficking an offense.274 The question becomes to what
extent U.S. courts refer to the U.N. Protocol or other related international
legal standards when they rule on cases of trafficking. There is evidence
that American courts incorporate international conventional law when
deciding a domestic case.275 The Supremacy Clause states that “this
constitution as the law of the United States and all treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby.”276
B. International Legal Instruments Used by Domestic Courts in Deciding
Cases of Trafficking in Persons
Incorporating international law in cases of trafficking in persons and
sexual exploitation was the issue in several recent cases. In one case, the
issue was whether an international convention provides a plaintiff with a
cause of action. In Nattah, the plaintiff worked as an Arabic linguist in
Kuwait for L-3 Communications Titan. He claimed to have been sold as “a
slave” to the U.S. military in Iraq and forced to work against his will. The
plaintiff alleged that this violated international law, which the court
dismissed, ruling that the plaintiff cannot assess a claim under the U.N.
Charter because that treaty provides no right of action against private
entities.277 The court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that he had an
action under the U.N. Protocol, saying “[t]he court is aware of no authority
that would permit plaintiff to assert a private right of action . . . under this

274. U.N. Protocol, supra note 79, at art. 5(1) (“Each State Party shall adopt such
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences the
conduct set forth in article 3 of this Protocol, when committed intentionally. 2. Each
State Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
establish as criminal offences: (a) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system,
attempting to commit an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this
article; (b) Participating as an accomplice in an offence established in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this article; and (c) Organizing or directing other persons to commit an
offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.”).
275. See generally Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005)
(agreeing that there is a legal presumption that Congress must legislate in a manner
consistent with international law, and that standards in the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC) were applicable).
276. U.S. CONST. art. 7, cl. 2.
277. Nattah v. Bush, 541 F. Supp. 2d 223, 233 (9th Cir. 1976) (failing to establish
that the Geneva Conventions provide a cause of action against a private party, and
explaining that “‘The Hague Conventions similarly cannot be construed to afford
individuals the right to judicial enforcement’ and ‘may have never been regarded as
law private parties could enforce.’ Simply put, plaintiff’s international law allegations
have failed to state a claim upon which this Court may grant relief.”) (quoting Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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protocol.”278
Plaintiffs may, however, invoke the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)279
when claiming a violation of international law. Such was the case in Roe v.
Bridgestone Corp., where the federal district court, relying upon Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain,280 concluded that:
[T]here is a broad international consensus that at least some extreme
practices called ‘forced labor’ violate universal and binding international
norms. But the adult plaintiffs in this case allege labor practices that lie
somewhere on a continuum that ranges from those clear violations of
international law (slavery or labor forced at the point of soldiers’
bayonets) to more ambiguous situations involving poor working
conditions and meager or exploitative wages.281

In this case, the adult and child plaintiffs, who worked on a rubber
plantation in Liberia, sued their employers and affiliated companies in
Liberia, Japan, and the United States. They claimed that the working
conditions violated the ATCA,282 the Thirteenth Amendment, and forced
labor laws.283 The court followed the standard adopted by the Supreme
Court in Sosa, where the plaintiff must show a violation of an international
norm that is “specific, universal, and obligatory.”284
In United States v. Bianchi,285 a federal court in Pennsylvania declared

278. Id. at 235.
279. For a discussion of the Alien Tort Claims Act, see generally M. Anderson

Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original Language of the Alien
Tort Statute, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 316, 317 (2009) (discussing the unchartered
territory of defining the term “alien” in the ATS as the drafters intended); Chad G.
Marzen, The Furundzija Judgment and Its Continued Vitality in International Law, 43
CREIGHTON L. REV. 505, 505 (2010) (outlining the implications of the Furundzija
holding on the United States’ treatment of ATS cases); Erin Stapp, Third-Party
Liability for Violations of the Law of Nations: Apply International Law, the Law of the
Situs, or Domestic Standards?, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 495, 495 (2009) (revealing
that the ATS could become very useful in increasing corporations’ accountability for
their role in human rights violations); Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, In Search of Alternative
Solutions: Can the State of Origin Be Held Internationally Responsible for Investors’
Human Rights Abuses That Are Not Attributable to It?, 35 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 155,
159 (2010) (presenting the argument that a home state is still internationally
responsible for an investor’s violation of human rights); Martha Lovejoy, Note, From
Aiding Pirates to Aiding Human Rights Abusers: Translating the Eighteenth-Century
Paradigm of the Law of Nations for the Alien Tort Statute, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J. 241, 244-47 (2009) (plotting the history of the ATS in the United States and the
cases that shaped its effect).
280. 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004) (illustrating that the ATS only enforces a narrow
set of specific norms of international law).
281. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1010 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
282. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
283. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589-90 (2006).
284. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
285. No. 06-19, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37103 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2007).
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that “the sexual abuse of children is universally condemned.”286 In this
case, the defendant was convicted for traveling with the intent to engage in
illicit sexual conduct in foreign places in violation of section 2423(e) and
using a facility in foreign commerce to entice a minor to engage in sexual
activity in violation of section 2422(b). The defendant traveled to Moldova
on five occasions to engage in illicit sex with minors whom he induced into
consensual sex through gifts and money. The defendant also raped them.
He challenged his indictment on constitutional grounds, arguing that by
enacting 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), Congress overstepped their powers under the
Foreign Commerce Clause.287 The court stated that, “Congress’s authority
under the Foreign Commerce Clause is broad,”288 and that section 2423(c),
“applies only to American citizens or permanent residents who travel in
foreign commerce.”289 The defendant was charged with engaging in illicit
sex acts that allegedly occurred on trips where he flew in international
commercial flights to Moldova, Romania, or Cuba, then flew back to the
United States. The international community has vigorously and uniformly
condemned these types of illicit sex acts. The Optional Protocol (to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution, and Child Pornography)—which has been ratified by 119
countries, including the United States, Moldova, and Cuba—requires that
the sexual exploitation of children be fully covered by a signatory’s
national criminal law, “whether such offenses are committed domestically
or transnational.” Accordingly, because the defendant failed to make “a
plain showing that Congress has exceeded its Constitutional bounds in
enacting 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), his Foreign Commerce Clause challenge will
be denied.”290 The court thus relied on the international instrument to rule
on the extent of the Foreign Commerce Clause.291
In United States v. Pendleton,292 the defendant, a U.S. citizen, was
arrested, convicted, and sentenced under German law for having sexual
contact with a teenage boy. Upon his deportation back to the United States,
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at *4.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
Bianchi, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37103, at *13.
Id. at *15.
Id.
See United States v. Armstrong, No. EP-07-CR-2276-DB, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82821, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2007) (holding that criminal liability may be
found even when the defendant’s travel was commenced without the intent to have sex
with a minor, but where, nonetheless, the defendant engaged in illegal sexual activity
during the course of a trip to another country); see also id. at *1 n.2 (“Any United
States citizen . . . who travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual
conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
30 years, or both.”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006)).
292. No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2009).
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he was charged with a violation of the PROTECT Act: traveling in foreign
commerce to engage in illicit sexual activity with a minor.293 In rejecting
his double jeopardy claim, the Delaware District Court noted that:
[T]he defendant’s argument that this prosecution is unreasonable as a
matter of international law because he was previously prosecuted in
Germany is . . . unpersuasive. The fact that Germany has an interest in
regulating, and does regulate the behavior of adults toward children
within its territorial limits, in no way diminishes the interest the United
States has in regulating that same behavior when it involves one of its
citizens. In this case [defendant]’s previous prosecution, conviction, and
term of imprisonment in Germany for a German sexual offense does not,
in any way, diminish or bar prosecution or enforcement of United States
law under the Protect Act. Germany and the United States are separate
sovereigns.294

Consequently, the court concluded that the defendant’s prosecution
under the PROTECT Act of the United States was not barred by principles
of international law. The court stated that, “[t]he validity of the laws of the
United States do not depend on international law . . . . A state may not
exercise jurisdiction to persuade law with respect to a person or activity
having connection with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction
is ‘unreasonable.’”295
In United States v. Clark,296 the defendant, a U.S. citizen, was arrested in
Cambodia by the Cambodian National Police for engaging in sexual
contact with two Cambodian boys. Clark had lived in Cambodia for
approximately five years.297 A federal court in Washington State found the
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), (f)(1) (2006).
Pendleton, 2009 WL 330965, at *6.
Id. at *5.
315 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
Id. at 1129 (depicting the defendant’s activities within the five year period in
Cambodia). See generally Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Foreign Commerce
Clause-Ninth Circuit Holds that Congress Can Regulate Sex Crimes Committed by
U.S. Citizens Abroad-United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006), 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2612, 2619 (2006) (concluding that United States v. Clark is just the beginning
of a predictably increasing slate of legislation and litigation reflecting the growing
globalization of political, economic, and health institutions); Daniel Bolia, Policing
Americans Abroad: The Protect Act, the Case Against Michael Lewis Clark, and the
Use of the Foreign Commerce Clause in an Increasingly Flat World, 48 S. TEX. L.
REV. 797, 801 (2007) (highlighting that the defendant in Clark was the first person to
be prosecuted under the extraterritorial provisions of the PROTECT Act); Amy
Messigian, Love’s Labour’s Lost: Michael Lewis Clark’s Constitutional Challenge of
18 U.S.C. 2423(C), 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2006) (introducing the purpose
of the paper, which is to analyze the arguments in Clark and the implications of the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling); Julie Buffington, Note, Taking the Ball and Running with It:
U.S. v. Clark and Congress’s Unlimited Power Under the Foreign Commerce Clause,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 841, 841 (2006) (presenting the Clark case as an opportunity for
courts to find that the illicit sex acts statute fell within Congress’s Foreign Commerce
Clause powers); Jeff Christensen, Comment, Congressional Power to Regulate
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extraterritorial application of the sex tourism statute reasonable under
international law:
Although there is only a minimal link between the activity sought to be
regulated by this statute and the territory of the United States, several of
the other factors favor a finding of reasonableness here. There is a
strong connection between the United States and its citizens (and
resident aliens) who commit the illicit activity. The prohibition against
sexual activity with young children is considered desirable and is widely
accepted. There is very little likelihood of conflict with regulation by
other states.298

In United States v. Frank,299 the defendant, a U.S. citizen, was indicted
for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) on five occasions by traveling to
Cambodia to engage in illicit sexual activity with various females under the
age of 18. The court noted that “one of the statutes that Congress enacted
to implement that Optional Protocol was section 2423(c), part of [the
PROTECT Act].”300 The defendant argued that exercising extraterritorial
Noncommercial Activity Overseas: Interstate Commerce Clause Precedent Indicates
Constitutional Limitations on Foreign Commerce Clause Authority, 81 WASH. L. REV.
621, 622 (2006) (arguing that the criminalization of noncommercial sexual abuse of
minors in foreign countries is not within the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause).
298. Clark, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1132 (referring to factors considered in determining
reasonableness of the application of a law on extraterritorial basis contained in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of Law of the United States, section 403(2):
“(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections such as nationality
residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the duty to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is desired to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the
importance of regulation to the regulatory state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the
traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another state may have an
interest in regulating the activities; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by
another state.”).
299. 486 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2007), aff’d 599 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2010).
300. Id. at 1357-58 (“[Defendant] does not contend that the Optional Protocol was
beyond the treaty power granted to the President by the Constitution. Nor could he.
First, nothing in the Optional Protocol—insofar as it relates to commercial sex with
minors—is prohibited by the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Second, child sex
tourism is undoubtedly a significant problem and is, by its very nature, a global
concern. Not only are American citizens going abroad to have sex with child
prostitutes, there is the possibility that foreigners will come to the United States for the
same purpose . . . . President Clinton therefore could personally have believed, as he
said in his letter of transmittal to the Senate, that child sex tourism required an
international solution like the one contained in the Optional Protocol, including extraterritorial criminal prosecution by countries of their own citizens for engaging in
commercial sex with minors abroad . . . . The next questions are whether, under rational
basis review, Congress could enact § 2423(c) under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
implement the Optional Protocol and, if so, whether the statues—insofar as commercial
sex with minors is concerned- reasonably implements the Optional Protocol . . . . The
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jurisdiction violates international law. The court disagreed. It stated:
Congress has the power to control (and punish) the conduct of American
citizens abroad . . . . International law, moreover, generally allows a
country to exert extra-territorial jurisdiction over its own citizens, as long
as the exercise of such jurisdiction is not unreasonable . . . . Finally,
“public international law is controlling only where there is no treaty and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision.” . . . Here
there is a treaty–the Optional Protocol—ratified by both the United
States and Cambodia.301

In addition, the court stated that the U.S. statute did not infringe on the
sovereignty of Cambodia. It continued:
As an initial matter, section 2423(c) does not regulate the conduct of the
Cambodian nationals (or, for that matter, the nationals of any countries
other than the United States). In addition, as noted earlier, Cambodia
ratified the Optional Protocol in May of 2002 . . . . If Cambodia does not
believe that the Optional Protocol infringes on its sovereignty—and it
obviously does not—it will not be offended by laws enacted by the
United States to implement the Optional Protocol, which regulate the
conduct of American citizens abroad.302

CONCLUSION
The TVPA has evolved since 2000, creating various criminal statutes
and adding new offenses to enhance prosecution in cases of trafficking. In
2005, the TVPRA added section 3271 criminal offenses committed by
Federal contractors outside the United States. Then, in 2008, Congress
answer to both questions is yes. First, § 2423(c) bears a national relationship to the
Optional Protocol in general, and to article 2(b) and 3(1)(b)—which deals with child
prostitution- in particular . . . . Second, § 2423(c) reasonably implements the Optional
Protocol. Article 3(4) and 4(2) required that countries take appropriate measures to
establish the liability of individual for offenses such as paying a child for sex. Extraterritorial criminal liability is one of the options allowed by the Optional Protocol, and
§ 2423(c) has extra-territorial application . . . . Moreover, defining a minor as a person
under that age of 18 . . . is also congruent with the Optional Protocol.”). See generally
INTERNATIONAL CHILD SEX TOURISM: SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM AND COMPARATIVE
CASE STUDIES (2007), available at http://www.protectionproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/09/JHU_Report.pdf (presenting a collection of articles and case
studies on child sex tourism).
301. Frank, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (“[T]he Constitution gives the President the
authority to enter into treaties, subject to ratification by the Senate. All Treaties made
under the authority of the United States become the ‘supreme law of the land’ and
Congress has, pursuant to the necessary and proper clause, the power to enact
legislation to implement treaties.”).
302. Id. at 1359-60; see also United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 800
(W.D. Tex. 2009) (describing that citizenship alone gives Congress the right to enact
laws with extraterritorial application, an authorizing jurisdiction that may also therefore
be apparent under the “passive personality” principle). See generally Joanna Doerfel,
Comment, Regulating Unsettled Issues in Latin America Under the Treaty Powers and
the Foreign Commerce Clause, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 331 (2008) (describing
the global problem of sex tourism, specifically in Latin America).
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added three new statutes to the TVPA: section 1593A (benefitting
financially from peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons); section 1594
(conspiring in trafficking); and section 1351 (fraud in foreign labor
contracting). Courts acknowledge that neither section 1584 nor section
1590 of the TVPA specify a statute of limitations and by analogy to section
1595 provided for a ten-year statute of limitations.303 If a sex trafficking
case involves a child, the statute of limitations is abolished altogether.304
Since 2000, courts relying on the plain statutory language of the text of
the TVPA, findings of Congress, the legislative history of the Acts and
congressional meetings as main tools of legal interpretation, have broadly
interpreted the criminal statutes of the TVPA to expand criminal liability
and enhance the penalty against the offender who takes advantage of a
vulnerable victim. Courts rule that some victims are more vulnerable than
others based on several criteria, including their distance from home, family,
and familiar institutions, their unfamiliarity with the language, and their
fear of retribution and forcible removal to countries in which they face
retribution.305 Although many victims of trafficking suffer from these
circumstances, the TVPA never characterizes victims as inherently
vulnerable, so there is potential to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement
doctrine to cases of trafficking in persons.
Courts also reject the theory that forced labor must amount to traditional
slavery in order to be prosecutable.306 The general consensus is that the
crime of slavery is not limited to traditional oppression of a single race or
ethnicity, but that it has the potential to affect anyone.307 Another broad
interpretation of the TVPA’s criminal statutes is defining a commercial sex

303. See Hernandez v. Attisha, No. 09-CV-2257 IEG (WMC), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20235 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010).
304. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 202, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (“No Statute
of Limitations for Child Abduction and Sex Crimes . . . . No Statute of limitations that
would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical
abuse, or kidnapping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such
prosecution during the life of the child.”).
305. See United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 252 (2d Cir. 2010) (revealing a
variety of factors that made the victims in this case vulnerable, such as the defendants’
confiscation of the victims’ travel documents, the fact that the victims could not speak
English, and the fact that the victims were entirely dependent on the defendants for
their survival).
306. See Doe v. Reddy, No. C 02-05570 WHA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26120, at
*33 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2003) (contending that modern forms of slavery, such as labor
procured through threats of serious harm, are sufficient for establishing a violation of
human rights).
307. See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasizing
that the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution was meant to reach every race and
every individual); see also United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir.
1984) (clarifying that the Thirteenth Amendment is not limited to a classic form of
slavery but also encompasses contemporary forms of involuntary servitude).
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act to include both prostitution and pornography.308 While courts still
require the existence of coercion in order to classify an act as a form of
human trafficking, courts broaden the interpretation of coercion to include
not just physical and legal coercion, but also psychological coercion, thus
expanding the definition of coercion under United States v. Kozminksi.309
The courts clearly define abuse or threatened abuse of the law or legal
process to include the threat of deportation.310
A reading of courts’ interpretation of the TVPA suggests that they define
the burden of proof so that unnecessary elements are not required to
establish the crime of trafficking in persons. For example, prosecution for
labor trafficking is not dependent upon demonstration that the labor was for
a “business purpose.”311 Additionally, obtaining a commercial sex act need
not be the “dominant purpose” of the trafficker’s use of coercion or threats
for the scenario to be considered trafficking.312 The intent to coerce
someone to perform a commercial sex act is the only requirement for
prosecution, not the act itself,313 and a prior consensual relationship
between the trafficker and the victim does not release the trafficker from
liability.314 Most constitutional challenges to the TVPA, the International
Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005, and the PROTECT Act have
failed. In 2008, the TVPA was amended to apply to all of the crimes on an
extraterritorial basis, thus adding a legislative tool to prosecute all cases of
trafficking in persons regardless of where the act of trafficking has
occurred.
In essence, the TVPA is an implementation of the U.N. Protocol on
Trafficking. Although U.S. courts rarely incorporate the Protocol, or other
international legal instruments, one can infer from the judicial decisions
decided in the last ten years that the principles that U.S. courts established
are in harmony with international principles, whether they be the
prohibition of slavery or exploitation. Utilizing international law becomes

308. See United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(concluding that Congress would have written the statute to limit the commercial sex
acts to prostitution if it had intended to do so, but it did not).
309. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
310. See Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd., No. 06-cv-01043-WYD-MJW, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567, at *23-24 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2007) (expanding the scope of
threats from physical to verbal threats of abusing the legal process); see also United
States v. Veerapol, 312 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (including threats of legal
deportation as legal coercion used to induce involuntary servitude).
311. United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008).
312. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (pointing out that the Second Circuit has never
limited the purpose of the defendant’s conduct to the prohibited conduct).
313. Iowa v. Russell, No. 9-906/08-2034, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 145, at *8 (Iowa
Ct. App. filed Mar. 10, 2010).
314. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
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necessary in cases of trafficking in persons when the crime is transnational
in nature, has a vast global economic impact, and involves a vulnerable
victim from a foreign country crying for redress and praying for justice and
freedom.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss4/14

58

